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TRIAL AND ERROR: LEGISLATING ADR FOR 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM 
LYDIA NUSSBAUM* 
ABSTRACT 
 The U.S. healthcare system has a problem: hundreds of thou-
sands of people die each year, and over a million are injured, by 
medical mistakes that could have been avoided.  Furthermore, over 
ninety percent of these patients and their families never learn of 
the errors or receive redress.  This problem persists, despite myr-
iad reforms to the medical malpractice system, because of lawmak-
ers’ dominant focus on reducing providers’ liability insurance 
costs.  Reform objectives are beginning to change, however, and 
the vehicle for implementing these changes is alternative dispute 
resolution (“ADR”).  Historically, legislatures deployed ADR to 
curb malpractice litigation and restrict patients’ access to courts.  
Today, a new law in Oregon combines early disclosure and ADR 
to help injured patients get answers and compensation, and to im-
prove medical safety.  This Article examines Oregon’s innovative 
ADR program and argues that, in contrast to earlier ADR reforms, 
the program constructs an entirely new alternative to the conven-
tional tort system.  This alternative shows promise and may suc-
ceed where other ADR reforms have failed; nevertheless, addi-
tional protections are critical to ensure fairness for patients, 
providers, and the public. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. medical liability system has had a problem for quite some time.  
Growing evidence indicates that a significant number of people in the United 
States die or suffer serious injury from mistakes in their medical treatment, 
yet neither they nor their families ever learn about the error or receive com-
pensation.  In the years since the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) first named 
preventable patient deaths as a leading cause of death in its 1999 report, To 
Err is Human, more recent studies identify medical error as the third most 
common cause of death in the United States.1  Anywhere from 200,000 to 
400,000 patients die every year from medical errors that could be avoided.2  
                                                          
 1.  INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1, 26 (Linda T. 
Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (estimating that between 44,000 and 98,000 people die each year from pre-
ventable medical errors in American hospitals, more than the numbers of people who die from “mo-
tor vehicle accidents (43,458), breast cancer (42,297), or AIDS (16,516)”); Martin A. Makary & 
Michael Daniel, Medical Error—The Third Leading Cause of Death in the U.S., BMJ (May 3, 
2016), http://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i2139 (referring to studies published after To Err is 
Human and indicating even higher numbers of fatalities due to medical errors). 
 2.  John T. James, A New, Evidence-Based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated with Hospi-
tal Care, 9 J. PATIENT SAFETY 122, 125 (2013). 
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When it comes to nonfatal, preventable patient injuries, the incidence rates 
increase dramatically.  The Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services reports that, in one month alone, an es-
timated 130,000 Medicare beneficiaries sustained serious harm during hos-
pitalization, nearly half of which might have been preventable.3 
While preventable deaths and injuries from medical treatment demand 
attention, this Article addresses the problem of their aftermath.  Specifically, 
that patients and providers lack a constructive legal process for addressing 
and responding to these incidents.4  The conventional tort system provides 
the traditional means for addressing patient injury through malpractice 
claims.  But, for many reasons, this process fails to protect providers and 
patients.5  Providers tend to define medical error more narrowly than patients 
and rarely inform patients and their families when medical mistakes occur.6  
In the absence of transparency, patients use malpractice claims to extract an-
swers.7  The adversarial nature of lawsuits further drives a wedge between 
patients and providers and frustrates opportunities for candor and coopera-
tion.8  The general lack of communication between providers and patients 
following an unanticipated, adverse outcome of medical treatment creates 
                                                          
 3.  DANIEL R. LEVINSON, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADVERSE EVENTS IN 
HOSPITALS: NATIONAL INCIDENCE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 18, 22–24 (2010).  In Oc-
tober 2008, forty-four percent of all serious harms (harms resulting in a prolonged hospital stay, 
permanent harm, necessitating life sustaining intervention, or contributing to the patient’s death) 
and temporary harms were identified as “clearly” or “likely preventable.”  Id.  If this injury rate 
were sustained over twelve months, the annual number of injured patients would approximate 1.56 
million Medicare beneficiaries severely injured by their medical care (and this is only Medicare 
beneficiaries, a subset of all patients in the United States). 
 4. For purposes of this Article, the term “providers” is used to describe all licensed profes-
sionals who provide health services to patients, such as doctors, nurses, physician’s assistants, chi-
ropractors, emergency medical technicians, physical therapists, pharmacists, and naturopaths. 
 5.  See infra Part I.B. 
 6.  See generally Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding 
the Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001 (2003); Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure 
Practices: Results of a National Survey, 22 HEALTH AFF. 73 (2003) (concluding from a study of 
500 diverse hospitals that disclosure rates remain far below the estimated numbers of deaths and 
injuries, and many providers remain reluctant to disclose medical errors for fear of malpractice lit-
igation). 
 7.  See generally ROSEMARY GIBSON & JANARDAN PRASAD SINGH, WALL OF SILENCE: THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF THE MEDICAL MISTAKES THAT KILL AND INJURE MILLIONS OF AMERICANS 
210–216 (2003) (interviewing patients who suffered from medical injuries and families about their 
experiences communicating with providers); Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Understanding Patients’ 
Perceptions of Medical Errors, 2 J. COMM. HEALTHCARE 34 (2009). 
 8.  Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t Know About the Role of Apologies in 
Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1010–15 (2005) (highlighting that 
despite legislative interventions to make disclosure of medical error mandatory or to render apolo-
gies for medical errors inadmissible as evidence, providers are often advised against disclosures and 
apologies or any discussion of responsibility).  
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stress and confusion for the people directly involved,9 undermines the deliv-
ery of quality care,10 and leads to additional healthcare costs for patients, their 
families, and society as a whole.11 
One might think that after four decades of legislative reforms to the 
medical liability system, its capacity for delivering corrective justice by rem-
edying patient harm and preventing future errors should have improved.12  It 
has not.  This problem persists, in large part, because the predominant focus 
of state legislators has been on reducing providers’ medical liability insur-
ance premiums, not the underlying systemic problems of poor communica-
tion and lack of transparency.13  Legislators believed, inaccurately, that pa-
tient lawsuits directly caused skyrocketing insurance liability premiums and 
that this “malpractice crisis,” which could drive doctors out of business or 
out-of-state, could be stopped by reducing litigation costs.14  Consequently, 
state legislators have passed laws to restrict medical malpractice litigation by 
making it harder for patients to initiate complaints in court and to prevail once 
they get there.15 
Recently, the Oregon legislature enacted a law that offers a promising 
solution to the problems surrounding communication and redress for patient 
injury.  Unlike earlier medical malpractice reforms, Oregon lawmakers con-
structed a parallel system, an ADR process called Early Discussion and Res-
                                                          
 9.  John F. Christensen et al., The Heart of Darkness: The Impact of Perceived Mistakes on 
Physicians, 7 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 424, 426 (1992) (conducting in-depth interviews with phy-
sicians and finding that, after mistakes leading to “bad outcomes,” they had feelings of “fear, guilt, 
anger, embarrassment, and humiliation [that] were unresolved . . . even a year after the mistake”); 
Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal 
Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1612–13 (1994).   
 10.  Jenny Firth-Cozens & Joanne Greenhalgh, Doctors’ Perceptions of the Links Between 
Stress and Lowered Clinical Care, 44 SOC. SCI. MED. 1017, 1019–21 (1997). 
 11.  Daniel P. Kessler, Evaluating the Medical Malpractice System and Options for Reform, 25 
J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (2011); Michelle M. Mello et al., Who Pays for Medical Errors? An Analysis of 
Adverse Event Costs, the Medical Liability System, and Incentives for Patient Safety Improvement, 
4 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 835 (2007). 
 12.  Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Ev-
idence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1595–1602 (2002); David Bornstein, Reduc-
ing Preventable Harm in Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), http://opinionator.blogs.ny-
times.com/2016/01/26/reducing-preventable-harm-in-hospitals/. 
 13.  See infra Part I.C. 
 14.  TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 3, 62 (2005) (explaining the relation-
ship between litigation expenses and liability insurance premiums and debunking the theory of di-
rect, positive causality).  At different points during the 1970s, 1980s, and again in the early 2000s, 
medical malpractice insurance premiums increased dramatically.  Providers in certain parts of the 
country and in certain medical specialties found it difficult to obtain and afford liability insurance; 
for example, from 2000 to 2004, internists in Connecticut saw their premiums increase by over 
300%.  AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM NOW!: THE FACTS YOU NEED TO KNOW 
TO ADDRESS THE BROKEN MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 9 (2016), http://ama-assn.org/go/mlrnow; 
see also infra Part I.C. 
 15.  See infra Part I.C. 
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olution, designed to respond directly to the conventional tort system’s inabil-
ity to deliver corrective justice.  The first statewide program of its kind, Early 
Discussion and Resolution is non-adversarial and does not rely on proving 
negligence.  Instead, it combines early disclosure of adverse healthcare 
events with a confidential conversation between patients and healthcare pro-
viders.16  The purpose of this new law is to help patients learn about what 
went wrong, to enable providers to make improvements in healthcare deliv-
ery, and to allow the parties to discuss appropriate financial compensation 
without resorting to litigation and court.17 
Oregon’s new law needs to be understood within the larger story of how, 
and why, states repeatedly use ADR procedural interventions to effect sub-
stantive policy outcomes.  Successive generations of ADR procedures should 
be recognized as reflections of policymakers’ evolving understanding of the 
medical liability problem.  Starting in the 1970s, state legislatures mandated 
different kinds of ADR processes, experimenting first with medical screening 
panels and later with binding arbitration and mediation, both of which be-
came specialized procedures for medical malpractice claims.18  These spe-
cialized ADR procedures, however, were components of the larger legislative 
response intended to make it harder for patients to bring malpractice claims; 
accordingly, they functioned as roadblocks, restricting access to courts or 
limiting opportunities for judicial intervention.  In contrast, Oregon’s new, 
specialized ADR process attempts to address the problems of poor commu-
nication and lack of transparency, both of which contribute to cycles of pa-
tient injury, inadequate compensation, and missed opportunities for providers 
to learn from mistakes.19  Thus, Oregon’s approach not only creates a novel 
ADR process designed to achieve new reform objectives, but also it com-
pletely reimagines the utility of ADR for medical malpractice reform. 
This Article argues that experimentation with ADR procedural interven-
tions has been an critical component in the medical malpractice “testing 
ground” for new tort reforms.20  And, most importantly, these ADR interven-
tions have come to rely less and less on formal substantive and procedural 
law, demonstrating that principles of both tort and adversarial legalism are a 
“poor fit” for addressing the incidence of medical error in the modern 
                                                          
 16.  Resolution of Adverse Health Incidents Act, ch. 5, § 1(1), 2013 Or. Laws 1, 1 (codified at 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30.278, 31.250, 743.056 (West 2016)) [hereinafter Adverse Health Inci-
dents Act].  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 17.  See infra Part IV. 
 18.  See infra Part II. 
 19.  See infra Part IV.  
 20.  PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 33 (1991) (“Medical malpractice has 
served as the major testing ground not only for new tort doctrines but also for empirical research 
about the real-world impact of new laws.”). 
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healthcare system.21  Indeed, the latest experiment in Oregon constructs a 
whole new approach to corrective justice in the medical liability context that 
does not depend on proving negligence at all.  However, while this distancing 
from the conventional tort system has the potential to address the patient 
safety problem in ways previous ADR reforms could not, it also introduces 
new challenges that will need to be addressed if the patient safety reform 
project is to succeed.  Should other states seek to reform the culture around 
addressing and redressing harm to patients by implementing Early Discus-
sion and Resolution programs, additional protections will be critical to ensure 
that patients, providers, and the public can all be protected in this alternative 
system. 
To make this argument, the Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I ex-
plains how the current tort system fails to accomplish its goals of compensa-
tion and deterrence.  Instead of directly addressing these system failures, 
early reform efforts focused on restricting litigation to contain the costs of 
medical liability insurance premiums for providers.  Part II discusses the 
three forms of ADR legislators initially deployed to limit malpractice litiga-
tion—medical screening panels, binding arbitration, and mandatory media-
tion—and presents research showing that they have largely been ineffective.  
Part III introduces the patient safety movement and one alternative corrective 
justice model it inspired, called “early communication and resolution.”  Part 
IV examines Oregon’s Early Discussion and Resolution program, an ADR-
based alternative to the traditional tort system that aims to improve preven-
tion and compensation of patient injury.  Although Oregon’s program shows 
early promise, it also raises new concerns that will need to be addressed in 
order to meet its reform objectives.  In Part V, the Article concludes with 
additional observations about the diminishing role of common law tort and 
adversarialism in responding to and resolving patient injury disputes. 
I.  A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM IN NEED OF REFORM 
When a sick patient undergoes medical treatment, the hope and expec-
tation is that everything will go according to plan.  But sometimes mistakes 
and accidents happen during treatment that injure a patient, prolonging re-
covery or sometimes causing death.  These iatrogenic injuries, or adverse 
                                                          
 21.  Mello & Brennan, supra note 12, at 1618 (using the phrase “poor fit” to describe the mis-
match between instances of provider negligence and patient lawsuits). 
 2017] TRIAL AND ERROR 253 
outcomes caused by the medical treatment itself and not the underlying ill-
ness, are sometimes anticipated because the medical treatment is inherently 
risky.22  But, sometimes the injury results from simple human error.23 
For example, a neurosurgeon removing a spinal cord tumor might inad-
vertently damage nerves during the procedure and cause his patient to be-
come paralyzed down the right side of her body.24  In this case, the patient’s 
paralysis, while certainly an iatrogenic injury caused by the medical inter-
vention, was not preventable.  The injury was a consequence of a risky sur-
gery and not the result of the physician’s inattention or failure to comply with 
accepted surgical standards.  Contrast this neurosurgery example with the 
example of an adverse drug event.  A busy doctor, prescribing a new blood-
pressure medication to an elderly patient, forgets to check whether the patient 
is also taking anti-depressants, which can sometimes lower blood sodium 
levels.25  After taking the new medication, the patient’s blood pressure drops 
precipitously and he collapses, hits his head, and suffers seizures and broken 
bones.26  This case also involves a patient injury caused by medical treatment 
but, unlike the neurosurgery example, the iatrogenic injury was the result of 
an error that could have been prevented had the physician first consulted the 
                                                          
 22.  The medical injury terminology can be baffling.  First, one must distinguish between iat-
rogenic and non-iatrogenic adverse outcomes or injuries.  Then, within the category of iatrogenic 
injuries, one must further distinguish between those that were or were not caused by a preventable 
error.  As the IOM report explains:  
An adverse event is an injury resulting from a medical intervention, or in other words, it 
is not due to the underlying condition of the patient.  While all adverse events result from 
medical management, not all are preventable (i.e., not all are attributable to errors).  For 
example, if a patient has surgery and dies from pneumonia he or she got postoperatively, 
it is an adverse event.  If analysis of the case reveals that the patient got pneumonia be-
cause of poor hand washing or instrument cleaning techniques by staff, the adverse event 
was preventable (attributable to an error of execution).  But the analysis may conclude 
that no error occurred and the patient would be presumed to have had a difficult surgery 
and recovery (not a preventable adverse event). 
INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 4 app. C.  For a taxonomy of terms in the surgical setting, see INST. 
OF MED., supra note 1, at 210 app. B, Nancy C. Elder & Susan M. Dovey, Classification of Medical 
Errors and Preventable Adverse Events in Primary Care: A Synthesis of the Literature, 51 J. FAM. 
PRACTICE 927 (2002), and Jeffrey Phillip Jacobs et al., The Nomenclature of Safety and Quality of 
Care for Patients with Congenital Cardiac Disease: A Report of the Society of Thoracic Surgeons 
Congenital Database Taskforce Subcommittee on Patient Safety, 18 CARDIOLOGY YOUNG 81 
(2008). 
 23.  It is important to note that when providers obtain informed consent from patients by de-
tailing all the potential anticipated and unanticipated adverse outcomes possible in any medical 
treatment, such consent only covers events that were not preventable; therefore, it does not excuse 
those events caused by improper provider practice or systemic error. 
 24.  See HENRY MARSH, DO NO HARM: STORIES OF LIFE, DEATH, AND BRAIN SURGERY 4–5 
(2015) (discussing a similar scenario from which the neurosurgery example is adapted). 
 25.  See Jane E. Brody, Too Many Pills for Aging Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/too-many-pills-for-aging-patients/?_r=0 (discussing a 
similar scenario from which the anti-depressant example is adapted).  
 26.  Id. 
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patient’s records.27  Thus, there is an important categorical distinction be-
tween patient injuries caused by a preventable error in the medical treatment 
itself and an adverse outcome of medical treatment that, while one would 
certainly hope to avoid, was anticipated. 
Injured patients may have some form of health insurance to defray a 
portion of their added medical costs.28  However, their health insurance cov-
erage may have a high deductible, requiring substantial out-of-pocket pay-
ment before providing coverage.  Furthermore, health insurance may not 
cover long-term rehabilitation or custodial care and will not compensate lost 
wages or pain endured.  And, in the event a patient dies, health insurance will 
not cover burial or funeral arrangements. 
How do patients and their families obtain recompense?  In the United 
States, they turn to the tort system.  The legal system provides an avenue to 
assess and redress patient injuries through medical malpractice litigation.  
The ability of the medical malpractice system to compensate wrongfully in-
jured plaintiffs and deter negligence, however, is far from ideal.  This Part 
briefly explains the theoretical foundations of the malpractice system and 
then discusses some of the real and perceived problems propelling system 
reform efforts, including the ADR interventions that are the focus of this Ar-
ticle. 
A.  The Corrective Theory of Tort 
Medical malpractice liability is grounded in tort.  A central principle of 
tort is that a person harmed by someone else’s misbehavior should not have 
to bear the burden of the injury.29  The tort system’s two-part mission is to 
dispense “corrective justice” on the one hand and to deter carelessness on the 
other.  The “correction” of corrective justice refers to shifting responsibility 
for the harm from the victim to the culpable party.30  To enable this “correc-
tion,” the tort lawsuit sets up a “contest between two parties” and asks 
whether the plaintiff’s loss is the fault of the defendant and whether that loss 
was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s action.31  To prevail, the 
                                                          
 27.  Studies indicate that adverse drug events (referred to in the literature as “ADEs”), particu-
larly among the elderly, are a serious problem in the United States.  See, e.g., Daniel S. Budnitz et 
al., National Surveillance of Emergency Department Visits for Outpatient Adverse Drug Events, 
296 JAMA 1858 (2006); Jerry H. Gurwitz, Incidence and Preventability of Adverse Drug Events 
Among Older Persons in the Ambulatory Setting, 289 JAMA 1107 (2003). 
 28.  The Center for Disease Control’s National Center for Health Statistics reported in 2014 
that 11.5% of the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population lacked health insurance.  ROBIN A. 
COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY 
2014, at 1 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201506.pdf. 
 29.  Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 410 (1992). 
 30.  Id. at 408–10 (explaining that the Aristotelian account of corrective justice treats the de-
fendant’s unjust gain as correlative to the plaintiff’s loss).  
 31.  WEILER, supra note 20, at 44–45. 
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plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a duty of care to that plaintiff, 
the defendant failed in her duty, and that failure proximately caused the plain-
tiff’s injury. 
In its most basic form, negligent medical care, or medical malpractice, 
is the failure to do what a reasonable provider in the same specialty would 
have done under the same or similar circumstances.32  Taking the examples 
discussed earlier, the neurosurgeon would not be found negligent and liable 
for the patient’s paralysis because his actions in removing the tumor consti-
tuted reasonable, standard practice.  The doctor who failed to check the el-
derly patient’s existing prescriptions could be considered negligent and re-
sponsible for the patient’s injuries if, first, the patient could demonstrate that 
his injuries were a foreseeable result of drug interaction and, second, that 
another doctor in the same or similar circumstance would have consulted the 
medical chart, seen the prior prescriptions, and made a different decision.33 
If a judge or jury finds that a patient’s injury was caused by a doctor’s 
substandard care, then the patient is entitled to compensation for financial 
losses, such as lost earnings, medical bills, and other associated costs, as well 
as non-financial losses, such as pain and suffering.34  It is this attachment of 
liability to the doctor’s actions and judgments that comprises the deterrence 
component of the tort system.  In theory, doctors will be incentivized to take 
care when treating future patients in order to avoid becoming professionally 
and financially responsible for a patient’s injuries.35  In reality, however, the 
tort system does not function so smoothly. 
B.  The Realities of the Medical Malpractice System 
The medical malpractice system falls short of reaching both its objec-
tives—the corrective justice mission of compensating victims and the goal of 
                                                          
 32.  DOUGLAS A. HASTINGS ET AL., NAT’L HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
HEALTH LAW 136 (1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 
(AM. LAW. INST. 2010) (“Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct 
lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in harm, 
the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or 
reduce the risk of harm.”).  
 33.  Proving causation in the medical malpractice context is notoriously difficult.  Patients go 
to providers when they are already sick or injured and there is rarely universal consensus on what 
standard treatments should be for a particular patient.  Thus, given the complexities, diverse opin-
ions, and risks of modern medical treatments, it can be extremely hard to tell whether a death or 
disability occurred because of a mistake or not.  BAKER, supra note 14, at 15–16.  
 34.  PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE 
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 14 (1993).  Medical malpractice suits can involve pro-
viders other than physicians, though most states label malpractice by a non-physician health care 
provider as “professional negligence.”  E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41A.009, 41A.015 (Lex-
isNexis 2012).    
 35.  WEILER ET AL., supra note 34, at 14–15.  
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deterring future negligence.  Although most policymakers agree that the sys-
tem needs reform, there is less agreement around the reasons for its short-
comings. 
Scholars and researchers have identified an array of problems with the 
medical malpractice system.  For example, when it comes to compensating 
patients, the increasing cost, complexity, and interconnectedness of deliver-
ing and paying for modern healthcare not only makes the preliminary ques-
tion of proximate causation difficult to prove in all but the most extreme 
cases, but it also means payouts in patient compensation for those few ex-
treme cases are tremendously high.36  In addition, the rise of managed care 
organizations insulates providers from the intended deterrent effect of the tort 
system.37  Additional culprits identified for the poorly functioning medical 
liability system include the competitive nature of the medical malpractice in-
surance market and the imperfect actuarial assessments insurance carriers 
rely upon,38 as well as the economic39 and psychological40 realities of bring-
ing a lawsuit and getting sued in the American civil justice system.  Layered 
                                                          
 36.  See, e.g., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (William M. 
Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006) (covering the wide-ranging and multidimensional problems un-
derlying the medical malpractice crisis). 
 37.  Mello & Brennan, supra note 12, at 1603; see also Edward A. Dauer, When the Law Gets 
in the Way: The Dissonant Link of Deterrence and Compensation in the Law of Medical Malprac-
tice, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 293 (2000) (discussing how tort’s theories of deterrence and compensation 
are supposed to work and why they do not); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Resuscitating Hospital Enterprise 
Liability, 73 MO. L. REV. 369, 371–85 (2008) (arguing that an exclusive hospital enterprise liability 
system would deter future errors better than the current malpractice regime by holding health care 
delivery organizations (hospitals and managed care organizations) liable rather than individual pro-
viders). 
 38.  See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 14 (detailing the nature of medical malpractice liability insur-
ance and its contribution to the malpractice crisis); FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (2008) (explaining the medical malpractice crisis and recommending pol-
icy reforms). 
 39.  Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, Specialization, and Medical Mal-
practice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1061–66 (2006) (explaining economics of medical malpractice 
litigation for most plaintiffs’ attorneys).  Medical malpractice attorneys are particularly “ruthless” 
when it comes to screening, often accepting fewer than ten percent of all cases that come to them:  
The reasons for not taking low-value cases even though there may be malpractice in-
volved is simple.  There must be enough potential for recovery to pay for the costs of 
screening the case, the costs of preparing the case, the costs of actually litigating the case, 
the cost of the lawyer’s time, and possibly the cost of a referral fee to the lawyer who 
brought the case to the specialist.  On top of this, there must be enough financial recovery 
to help pay for the costs of screening all of the cases ultimately rejected by the lawyer, as 
well as other parts of the lawyer’s overhead.  
Id. at 1064.  Those people whose claims are not selected by medical malpractice plaintiffs’ attorneys 
have few options for legal representation and may turn to law firms that run high volume “settlement 
mills.”  For a discussion of this kind of personal injury legal practice, see Nora Freeman Engstrom, 
Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1486 (2009). 
 40.  See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Valerie P. Hans, The Psychology of Tort Law, in 1 
ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 249 (Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein eds., 2016) 
(drawing attention to the multiple connections between how the tort system operates and the human 
psychology of its key players—patients, providers, attorneys, insurers, judges and jurors); Kessler, 
 2017] TRIAL AND ERROR 257 
on top of these issues is a multiplicity of state and federal regulations41 and, 
adding in the political rhetoric of “crisis,” the result is one complicated, 
snarled problem.42 
This Section focuses on two significant problems with how the conven-
tional tort system operates.  First, a substantial number of patients are injured 
by mistakes in their medical treatment, yet the overwhelming majority never 
access the tort system to receive corrective compensation.  Second, provid-
ers’ sensitivity about malpractice accusations results in unproductive behav-
iors that make it harder to deter future mistakes in medical treatment. 
1.  Patient Injuries Without Compensation 
When it comes to compensating injured patients, the medical malprac-
tice system’s performance is far from optimal.  A well-functioning system 
would consistently remunerate as many negligently injured patients as possi-
ble.43  Instead, researchers find that the majority of such patients do not re-
ceive compensation because they never seek it and there is little connection 
between those patients who actually suffer negligent injuries and those who 
ultimately file malpractice claims.44 
                                                          
supra note 11, at 93, 95 (exploring the empirical question of whether, and how, tort reforms impact 
physician behavior and decisionmaking); Barbara J. Youngberg & Catalina Soto, Litigation Stress 
Support Groups for Healthcare Professionals: Risk Manager’s Role, 10 J. HEALTHCARE RISK 
MGMT. 14 (1990) (discussing “litigation stress syndrome”). 
 41.  For example, the 1986 Healthcare Quality Improvement Act established a National Practi-
tioner Data Bank and required providers and their liability insurers to report any payments made in 
response to a medical malpractice claim or face sanctions.  42 U.S.C. §§ 11131–11137 (2012).  
There are also voluntary and mandatory reporting systems for disclosing when adverse healthcare 
incidents occur.  See Lucian L. Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1633, 
1633–35 (2002). 
 42.  For an engaging history of the politics surrounding medical malpractice and healthcare 
reform, see Rogan Kersch, Medical Malpractice and the New Politics of Healthcare, in MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 43–44.  See also Douglas A. 
Kysar et al., Medical Malpractice Myths and Realities: Why an Insurance Crisis Is Not a Lawsuit 
Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 785 (2006). 
 43.  See, e.g., supra Part I.A and notes 29–42. 
 44.  These trends are not new.  The major and oft-cited studies supporting and verifying these 
findings use data gathered in the 1970s and 80s.  See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 18–25 (1985); Troyen A. Brennan et al., 
Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Med-
ical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991); Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of 
Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II, 324 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 377 (1991); A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and 
Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 245 (1991).  For an expanded discussion of these studies’ methodologies and other 
findings, see BAKER, supra note 14, at 24–38.  For discussion of how socioeconomic structures 
impact injured patients’ behavior and failure to claim, see Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis—
Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 443, 448–52 (1987). 
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In fact, only a tiny fraction of patients who suffer negligent injuries pur-
sue compensation by filing a malpractice claim.  The earliest study in Cali-
fornia gathered 21,000 patient records from twenty-four California hospitals 
and compared them to subsequent malpractice claim filings.  The study found 
that, at most, ten percent of patients who were victims of negligent medical 
treatment filed lawsuits and an even smaller percentage of those claims re-
sulted in compensation.45  Another study evaluated 31,000 patient records 
from fifty hospitals in New York searching for injuries caused by substandard 
care, and also investigated 3,500 malpractice claim filings, ultimately com-
paring the two data sets and finding that less than two percent of persons 
injured by negligence filed a claim.46  A related study comparing patient hos-
pital records to subsequent malpractice claim filing records in Colorado and 
Utah found that only 2.5% of negligently injured patients filed claims.47 
Although there is only a sliver of overlap between those patients who 
suffer medical injuries caused by negligence and those who pursue malprac-
tice claims for compensation, studies find that the malpractice system does a 
reasonable job of sorting valid from invalid claims.  The pool of claimants 
includes individuals who cannot demonstrate legal negligence,48 yet those 
people rarely receive settlement payouts or court awards.49 
                                                          
 45.  DANZON, supra note 44, at 24. 
 46.  Localio et al., supra note 44, at 245.  
 47.  David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and 
Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 255–57 (2000) (linking 14,700 patient medical records to four years 
of medical malpractice claiming data and finding not only that real victims of medical negligence 
almost never file suit to receive compensation, but also that the people in this “worthy-but-uncom-
pensated group” were more likely to be poor and elderly). 
 48.  David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Mal-
practice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2028 (2006) [hereinafter Studdert et al., Claims] 
(concluding that out of 1,452 malpractice claims, 97% of claims involved injury but, of those 1,406 
cases, 63% were due to error and 37% did not include error).  The 2000 study of malpractice claims 
in Utah and Colorado found that 78% of claims involved neither injury nor negligent care.  Studdert 
et al., supra note 47, at 253–54.   
 49.  BAKER, supra note 14, at 68–87 (summarizing studies of malpractice claiming and litiga-
tion outcomes); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Re-
form: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1092–1104 (2006) (explaining results of 
empirical studies debunking the theory that patients with invalid, frivolous claims receive compen-
sation); Studdert et al., Claims, supra note 48, at 2031 (finding that, although claims without evi-
dence of error are not uncommon, the vast majority of expenditures go to litigation and payment in 
cases involving error); PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE GREAT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE HOAX: NPDB DATA 
CONTINUE TO SHOW MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM PRODUCES RATIONAL OUTCOMES (2007) (sum-
marizing data from the National Practitioner Data Bank showing the malpractice system provides 
money for valid claims and dismisses those found invalid).  But see Troyen A. Brennan et al., Re-
lation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963 (1996) (finding that severity and permanence of injury were more deter-
minative of compensation than whether the injury was determined to be caused by negligence). 
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The few parties that do not settle their claims and instead pursue court 
litigation face a lengthy,50 expensive,51 and inefficient52 process.  Liability 
insurance companies bear the costs of defending claims whether they ulti-
mately win or lose.53  Plaintiffs that succeed in securing compensation for 
injuries arising from negligence usually only retain around sixty percent of 
the award, which may already be constrained by the providers’ liability in-
surance policy limit,54 with the remainder going to pay attorney fees and lit-
igation expenses.55 
So why do patients file claims if they get so little in return?  Research 
shows that claimants are often motivated by a desire for information rather 
than financial compensation.56  Patients seek greater honesty from providers, 
acknowledgment of the harm suffered, and reassurance that the mistake will 
not be repeated in the future.57  One famous study of parents whose children 
were neurologically impaired at birth found that twenty-four percent of par-
ents filed because they thought the provider was not completely honest or 
                                                          
 50.  Studdert et al., Claims, supra note 48, at 2024, 2026, 2031 (noting the average time be-
tween occurrence of the injury and closure of the claim was five years and that one in three claims 
took more than six years to resolve). 
 51.  Id. at 2026–27, 2031 (estimating that average compensation paid to plaintiffs ranges from 
$799,365 (out of court settlement) to $462,099 (trial verdict awards), a third of which goes to pay 
attorney fees and other costs; and the costs of defending malpractice claims average from $42,015 
(cases resolved out of court) to $112,968 (cases resolved by trial)). 
 52.  For every dollar spent on medical malpractice liability insurance, only forty cents reaches 
injured patients as compensation, with another forty cents going to pay legal fees, and the remaining 
twenty cents for insurance overhead.  Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, The Medical Mal-
practice System: Structure and Performance, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 11, 22 (citing Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical 
Malpractice, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1344 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. 
Newhouse eds., 2000)). 
 53.  Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH AFF. 
1569, 1572 (2010) (for every dollar paid in patient compensation, an additional nineteen cents are 
paid defending the claim).  
 54.  Charles Silver et al., Policy Limits, Payouts, and Blood Money: Medical Malpractice Set-
tlements in the Shadow of Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 559, 579–83 (2015).  Using an extended 
data set than previously used in earlier studies, researchers found that physicians are purchasing less 
liability insurance coverage—i.e., purchasing policies with limits of $100,000–$200,000 rather than 
$500,000–$1 million.  Researchers concluded that these policies operate as de facto limits on the 
amount injured patients can recover and offer a number of hypotheses, including that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys may not be motivated to pursue providers’ personal assets in all but the most egregious 
cases.  Id.  
 55.  WEILER, supra note 20, at 61–64 (noting that although under contingency fee arrangements 
plaintiffs generally pay nothing if they lose, attorneys tend to bill more in each case so that, if they 
win, the fees recouped can cover losses in other cases); see also SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 38, 
at 135–45 (explaining the history and economics of contingent fee arrangements). 
 56.  Hyman & Silver, supra note 49, at 1113–16 (explaining why patients do not sue—such as 
lack of information about the error, injuries determined too minor and/or already covered by health 
insurance, reluctance to damage relationship with provider and engage in lengthy and unpredictable 
litigation—and why patients do sue—such as severe injuries, inadequate healthcare insurance, irri-
tation with providers over failure to communicate). 
 57.  Vincent et al., supra note 9, at 1612–13. 
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lied; twenty percent of parents filed because they could not get anyone to tell 
them what happened; and nineteen percent said they filed out of anger, re-
venge or a desire to ensure it would not happen to anyone else.58  Therefore, 
for patients who perceive their providers as insufficiently candid or forth-
coming with information after an adverse medical event, litigation offers a 
means to obtain answers to the questions of what happened and whether it 
could have been prevented.59  The next Section explores some reasons for 
providers’ lack of communication. 
2.  Failures in Prevention and Communication 
The malpractice system also fails to achieve its second important objec-
tive: deterrence of provider behavior resulting in mistakes in medical treat-
ment.  In theory, for deterrence to work, the targeted actors must know what 
standards are expected of them, act rationally in weighing risks and benefits 
of different actions, and directly experience the negative impact of their care-
less behavior.60 
Research into the legal structure and economic incentives of the medical 
malpractice system demonstrates that, in reality, this theoretical calculus fails 
to add up.  First, the standards applicable to providers are not always clear: 
opinions about medical treatment can vary widely, making it difficult to iden-
tify which medical judgments are negligent and which are not.61  Second, 
providers have a difficult time self-monitoring their behavior with reasoned, 
cost-benefit analysis because the malpractice system appears unpredictable, 
a distortion partly due to the small numbers of claims and disproportionate 
targeting of providers in high-risk subspecialties such as obstetrics.62  Third, 
                                                          
 58.  Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice 
Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992) (other reasons for filing in-
cluded that parents needed money for their child’s future care and that they were advised to sue by 
someone else, usually a medical professional); see also Edward A. Dauer & Leonard J. Marcus, 
Adapting Mediation to Link Resolution of Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health Care Quality 
Improvement, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 201–04 (1997) (summarizing research studies of 
why patients sue their providers). 
 59.  BAKER, supra note 14, at 84 (citing Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Mal-
practice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. ECON. 199, 216 (1990)); 
Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in 
Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 778 (1994) [hereinafter Farber & White, A Compar-
ison].  These studies found that patients use litigation to find out if a hospital was negligent.  Cases 
involving clear evidence of either good or bad quality of care were dropped or settled, respectively, 
earlier than those cases where evidence was ambiguous.   
 60.  Mello & Studdert, supra note 52, at 18; see also Mello & Brennan, supra note 12, at 1602–
03.  
 61.  See, e.g., Eric J. Thomas et al., The Reliability of Medical Record Review for Estimating 
Adverse Event Rates, 136 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 812–14 (2002) (discussing a study in which phy-
sicians reviewed 500 medical records for adverse events and negligence and found that there was 
poor to moderate reliability among the physicians’ determinations of appropriate standard of care).  
 62.  Scholars and researchers find that providers perceive the malpractice system as random.  
Providers broadly alter their behavior to protect themselves in the event of a lawsuit rather than to 
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careless providers do not directly feel the immediate impact of their mistakes 
because so few negligently injured patients bring claims.63  And, malpractice 
liability insurance frequently shields bad actors from paying injured patients 
out of their own pockets.  Thus, bad actors may not see a resultant increase 
in their liability premiums any more than the good actors included in the same 
insurance plan.64  Thus, the malpractice system does not effectively deter 
providers’ negligent behavior. 
Instead, the menace of tort litigation deters constructive, positive behav-
ior such as open communication between patients and providers.  For exam-
ple, providers may avoid talking to a patient about an adverse outcome from 
medical treatment, explaining what occurred, or apologizing, for fear that 
what they say will later be used against them later in litigation.65  As a con-
sequence, providers can engage in “bristling” and “cloaking” behaviors, 
which interfere with the patient-provider relationship and open communica-
tion.66  Many providers respond to the threat of tort litigation by practicing 
defensive medicine as a prophylactic against a future finding of negligence, 
further adding to healthcare system costs that may not benefit and could even 
harm patients.67  There are many reasons for defensive medicine but one is 
                                                          
prevent injury in a given instance.  Moreover, the interconnected nature of modern medicine makes 
it difficult to target single careless actors.  See, e.g., SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 38, at 189–215; 
WEILER, supra note 20, at 70–92, 105–13; WEILER ET AL., supra note 34, at 111–34; Kessler, supra 
note 11, at 93; Mello & Brennan, supra note 12, at 1595; Mello & Studdert, supra note 52, at 17–
21, 23–29. 
 63.  WEILER ET AL., supra note 34, at 18–19, 112–17. 
 64.  Peter A. Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: 
Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 949–64 (1984). 
 65.  Gallagher et al., supra note 6, at 1001; Lamb et al., supra note 6, at 73; Wendy Levinson 
et al., Physician-Patient Communication: The Relationship with Malpractice Claims Among Pri-
mary Care Physicians and Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553 (1997); Robbennolt supra note 8, at 1012. 
 66.  Mello & Studdert, supra note 52, at 25–29 (“bristling behaviors” arise from provider sus-
picion and distrust of their patients, causing them to behave less personably, practice without liabil-
ity insurance, or require patients to sign liability waivers; “cloaking behaviors” include lack of com-
munication and reporting of errors).  The negative psychological impact of malpractice litigation on 
doctors and patients is profound—and not new.  See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan et al., Liability, Pa-
tient Safety, and Defensive Medicine: What Does the Future Hold?, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
AND THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 93, 110 (“The charge of negligence is felt 
as an unwarranted criminal accusation, and the doctor immediately becomes the victim.”); Maeve 
Ennis & Charles Vincent, The Effects of Medical Accidents and Litigation on Doctors and Patients, 
16 LAW & POL’Y 97 (1994); Daniel P. Kessler, supra note 11, at 93; Youngberg & Soto, supra note 
40 (discussing “litigation stress syndrome”); see also Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Error Versus Mal-
practice, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTHCARE L. 751, 755–57 (1997) (discussing the culture of infallibility 
among providers). 
 67.  Mello et al., supra note 53, at 1574–75 (estimating the annual costs of the medical liability 
system, including defensive medicine, to be $55.6 billion, which constituted 2.4% of total national 
healthcare spending in 2008); David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Spe-
cialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2612–14 (2005) (sur-
veying 824 physicians practicing in high-risk specialties and finding that ninety-three percent prac-
ticed defensive medicine (e.g., ordered more tests than patients needed; suggested invasive 
procedures not medically indicated; prescribed unnecessary medications; avoided caring for high 
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existing federal legislation requiring providers and their liability insurers to 
report any payment made in response to a medical malpractice claim to the 
National Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”)68 or else face sanctions.69  Pro-
viders are therefore reluctant to agree to even nominal settlements because 
they trigger reporting requirements, implying fault and tarnishing reputa-
tions.70  These factors combine to create a strong culture of “deny and de-
fend,” with many providers strongly opposed to compromising on claims, 
particularly those lacking clear evidence of negligence.71  Thus, the conven-
tional tort system creates an environment where providers fail to address un-
anticipated mistakes in medical treatment and, as a result, do not learn how 
to prevent them in the future. 
C.  Malpractice “Crisis” and Reform Response 
Given the inherent problems with the medical liability system, it is no 
wonder that the system has long been the target of legislative reform efforts 
at both the state and federal levels.72  However, despite the ineffectiveness, 
inaccuracy, and inefficiency of the tort system, reformers have not addressed 
the compensation and deterrence problems, at least until quite recently.73 
Instead, traditional reform efforts focused on something else entirely: 
reducing the cost of providers’ medical liability insurance premiums.  Behind 
these reform efforts is a fear that inaccessibility and unaffordability of pro-
fessional liability insurance for providers would drive them out of practice 
and cause shortages of healthcare delivery.74 
Liability insurance plays a critical role in the medical malpractice sys-
tem.  Providers and healthcare facilities, such as hospitals and nursing homes, 
regularly purchase medical malpractice liability insurance in the event they 
                                                          
risk patients altogether), particularly those who distrusted their liability coverage or perceived their 
liability insurance premiums as too burdensome). 
 68.  See infra Part IV.C.2.   
 69.  See supra note 41. 
 70.  See Katharine A. Van Tassel, Blacklisted: The Constitutionality of the Federal System of 
Publishing Reports of “Bad” Doctors in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2031, 2057–62 (2012). 
 71.  Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 203, 205–06 (1996) (stating that providers accused of malpractice want “to ‘clear 
their names’ . . . [and] are disinclined to approve settlements”).  For further discussion on the con-
cept of “deny and defend,” see Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malprac-
tice Claims? The University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. 125 (2009). 
 72.  For an exceptionally thorough discussion of the history, ideology, economics, methods, 
and subjects of various tort reform efforts through the ages, see F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and 
Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437 (2007). 
 73.  See infra Part III. 
 74.  BAKER, supra note 14, at 64–65 (explaining the difficulty in accessing and affording mal-
practice insurance for providers in certain areas of the country and in certain subspecialties). 
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are sued.75  Providers pay insurance carriers monthly premiums and, in ex-
change, insurance companies cover costs associated with defending claims 
and paying compensation awards to successful plaintiffs.76  As in other forms 
of insurance, premiums adjust to reflect the degree of risk involved in a pro-
vider’s specialty, the provider’s past history and experience, and the geo-
graphic area of the provider’s medical practice.77 
Periodically, the affordability and availability of liability insurance for 
providers become issues of concern.  Most notably, in the early 1970s, liabil-
ity insurance became unavailable in some parts of the country.78  Liability 
insurance again became unavailable or prohibitively expensive in the mid-
1980s and early 2000s, when insurance rates jumped and providers lacked 
sufficient revenue to absorb those higher premiums.79  The sharp increase in 
premiums stoked fears that providers, unable to afford the cost of practicing 
medicine, would shutter their offices and clinics and either relocate to a less 
expensive jurisdiction or stop practicing altogether.80 
                                                          
 75.  Indeed, many states require doctors to carry malpractice insurance as a condition of their 
medical license.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-301 (West 2016) (requiring every phy-
sician, dentist, dental hygienist, and health care institution to maintain set amounts of liability in-
surance coverage); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-11b (West 2016) (requiring physicians to maintain 
at least $500,000 of professional liability insurance coverage for an individual occurrence and $1.5 
million for aggregate incidents); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 122.2 (West 2016) (requiring dentists to 
maintain medical professional liability insurance). 
 76.  Standard provider policies provide $1 million coverage per incident and a maximum of $3 
million per year.  There are multiple layers of insurance coverage: providers and the healthcare 
organizations often purchase their own complementary policies or states provide a second-layer of 
coverage through a patient compensation fund.  Mello & Studdert, supra note 52, at 14–15. 
 77.  In 2009, an obstetrician practicing in Long Island paid $178,000 in insurance premiums 
while an internist paid $33,000, with the same specialists in Colorado each paying a third as much.  
Kessler, supra note 11, at 94 (citing RATE SURVEY, MEDICAL LIABILITY MONITOR (2009)). 
 78.  See SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 38, at 27–50. 
 79.  WEILER, supra note 20, at 4.  Between 1988 and 1991, many providers saw their malprac-
tice insurance premiums go from six percent of their gross revenue to twenty-five percent.  Id.  Dur-
ing the 2000–2004 crisis, the American Medical Association tracked premium increases, which 
showed significant jumps for obstetricians and gynecologists (in Miami-Dade, Florida, premiums 
increased from $147,621 to $277,241), general surgeons (in Philadelphia, metropolitan area premi-
ums increased from $33,684 to $128,524); and internists (in Connecticut, premiums increased from 
$7,736 to $28,917).  Id.; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 14, at 9.  
 80.  These fears derive from anecdotes and have not been substantiated in empirical studies.  
One study found that increases in malpractice liability premiums had no effect on provider reloca-
tion with the one exception for providers in certain rural areas.  Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chan-
dra, The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care, 8 FRONTIERS IN HEALTH 
POL’Y RES. 1 (2005).  Other studies found that providers and hospitals often pass the cost of pre-
mium hikes on to consumers and health insurance companies, although that can be harder for pro-
viders with fee-for-service reimbursement arrangements with insurers like Medicare and Medicaid 
that pay a fixed price.  See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, Who Pays When Malpractice Premiums Rise?, in 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 71–83; Patricia 
M. Danzon et al., The Effects of Malpractice Litigation on Physicians’ Fees and Incomes, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 122 (1990).  For a collection of anecdotes about premium hikes, hospital closures, and 
malpractice insurance bankruptcies in various states, see SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 38, at 63–
64 box 3.1. 
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The reasons for these fluctuations in liability insurance are complex and 
not directly connected to litigation rates.  Indeed, liability insurance unavail-
ability and the rise and fall in premiums appear to occur cyclically.81  These 
cycles follow a confluence of macro-economic factors,82 market competition 
among liability insurance carriers,83 and off-target actuarial predictions about 
projected insurance costs.84  The intermingling of these contributing factors 
affect insurance companies’ loss ratios at different points in time, requiring 
them to make up for unanticipated shortfalls by increasing providers’ premi-
ums quickly.85 
This complex picture did not inform policymakers’ reforms; instead, 
many assumed, incorrectly, that liability premium increases resulted directly 
from increased litigation.  Reform advocates blamed the frequency of patient-
initiated litigation and the magnitude of liability insurance payouts for liabil-
ity insurance premium hikes.86  As a consequence, what was a medical mal-
practice insurance crisis became publicly branded as a “medical malpractice 
crisis” demanding tort reform.87  Numerous empirical studies, however, have 
shown that these assumptions were misinformed.88 
State policymakers reacted to the perceived problem of excessive mal-
practice litigation by passing an “onslaught” of laws making it more difficult 
for patients to sue and prevail.89  Concluding that mid-century changes in tort 
                                                          
 81.  For a detailed discussion of the insurance market and how it fits into malpractice litigation, 
see ERIC NORDMAN ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
INSURANCE REPORT: A STUDY OF MARKET CONDITIONS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE 
RECENT CRISIS (2004). 
 82.  SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 38, at 44–46.  
 83.  Id. at 39–44.  
 84.  BAKER, supra note 14, at 51–58 (explaining the actuarial calculations underwriters use to 
predict future losses and how much or how little money to reserve for claims).  
 85.  David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 285 (2004).  
A loss ratio is the ratio of an insurance company’s payments and administrative costs to premiums 
collected.  
 86.  STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 92–
102 (1995) (examining the rhetorical claims and devices of medical malpractice reformers in the 
1980s and early 1990s). 
 87.  Tort reform is a highly politicized issue.  This Article deliberately attempts to cut through 
political rhetoric surrounding tort reform but includes citations to resources with rhetorical analysis.  
See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 14, at 10–14, 42–44 (explaining the politicization of malpractice re-
form); Hubbard, supra note 72; Kersch, supra note 42, at 43; John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 
100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021 (2005) 
(viewing American tort reform efforts as a reflection of business and industry reactions to social, 
political, and economic forces in the United States). 
 88.  See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 14, at 70–87 (summarizing research on medical malpractice 
claim frequency and payment outcomes); SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 38, at 51–70 (explaining 
economic and behavioral impact of litigation and threatened litigation on providers); NEIL VIDMAR 
& VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 321–38 (2007) (irrational jury awards have 
not caused the underlying problems with the medical malpractice system); Studdert et al., Claims, 
supra note 48, at 2024, 2032 (unmeritorious claims rarely succeed in litigation). 
 89.  Bell, supra note 64, at 943, 943–49. 
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doctrine made it too easy to sue providers,90 many states instituted a wide 
array of substantive and procedural reforms.  For example, legislatures en-
acted statutes limiting res ipsa loquitur to only certain kinds of injuries—
fault could be presumed when the wrong leg was amputated, for example, 
but not for misdiagnosis91—and establishing locality rules that tied standards 
of care to a particular geographic area rather than to a national standard.92  
Other statutory reforms curbed malpractice liability payouts by restricting 
noneconomic and punitive damages93 and by modifying rules on joint-and-
several liability and collateral sources of compensation.94 
States also passed procedural reforms to limit claimants’ access to 
courts.  New laws shortened statutes of limitation and required injured pa-
tients to obtain a plaintiff’s certificate of merit from a licensed attorney95 or 
an affidavit, report, or certificate from an independent expert.96  Included 
among these procedural reforms are statutes establishing ADR for medical 
malpractice claims.  These ADR-based reforms constitute a specific and of-
ten overlooked subset of procedural reforms and are the focus of this Article. 
II.  LIMITING LITIGATION WITH ADR 
As discussed in the previous Part, there are a number of fundamental 
problems with the conventional tort system.  Unfortunately, state legislative 
reform efforts have been dominated by one primary objective: to make pro-
viders’ liability insurance affordable by restricting the cost of medical mal-
practice litigation.  To achieve this objective, lawmakers experimented with 
                                                          
 90.  There is evidence of more litigation in the mid-twentieth century due in part to changes in 
tort law that made it easier for plaintiffs to bring legal claims; for example, courts permitting wider 
use of res ipsa loquitur to establish evidence of negligence, the removal of governmental and char-
itable immunity from hospitals, and the abandonment of the locality rule for establishing standards 
of care.  WEILER, supra note 20, at 19–26.  
 91.  See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.100 (2015); TEX. REV. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
Art. 4 § 74.201 (West 2015). 
 92.  Michelle Huckaby Lewis et al., The Locality Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma: Local 
Medical Practices vs the National Standard of Care, 297 JAMA 2633, 2635 (2007); WEILER, supra 
note 20, at 26–30. 
 93.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
41A.035 (2015); TEX. REV. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.301–.303 (West 2015). 
 94.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60G (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.045 
(2015).  For a helpful summary of state reforms and studies assessing their effects, see CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES (2004).  The Na-
tional Conference on State Legislatures maintains a relatively up-to-date database of state legisla-
tion relating to medical malpractice liability reform.  Medical Liability and Malpractice, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-com-
merce/medical-liability-and-malpractice.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2016). 
 95.  See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a (McKinney 2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (West 
2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West 2008).  
 96.  See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2015); TEX. REV. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 74.351 (West 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (West 2016). 
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a number of different ADR procedural interventions.97  While many state 
courts have their own rules for ADR in civil cases, these statutes reflect a 
broader public policy commitment either to limit patients’ access to the 
courts or to reduce their reliance on judicial intervention, or both.98 
Lawmakers institutionalized three different ADR interventions to make 
litigation less expensive and each process targeted a specific, problematic 
characteristic of malpractice litigation.  Lawmakers concerned about “frivo-
lous” or “unmeritorious” patient claims enacted legislation requiring plain-
tiffs to submit their claims to expert screening panels.99  Legislators, con-
vinced that lengthy, inexpert jury trials drove up litigation costs, passed 
statutes guiding parties to contract for binding arbitration and avoid court al-
together.100  More recently, lawmakers who viewed medical malpractice liti-
gation as needlessly prolonged by parties’ adversarial legalism101 promoted 
cooperative settlements by mandating parties to attend mediation.102  All 
three of these processes work to divert patients’ legal claims out of the con-
ventional tort system.  They do not address the tort system’s more profound 
structural problems, such as the large numbers of injured patients who never 
enter the system to receive compensation103 and the broken informational 
feedback loop that, if fixed, would enable providers to learn from the past 
and prevent mistakes in the future.104 
                                                          
 97.  Each successive ADR intervention followed a wave of insurance premium crises.  See 
SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 38, at 28 (noting three periods of crisis in medical malpractice insur-
ance: 1975–1978; 1984–1987; 2001–2004).  Medical malpractice screening panel legislation was 
largely established in the 1970s, binding arbitration legislation came in the 1980s, and mandatory 
mediation legislation became more common in the 2000s.   
 98.  Scholars debate whether such substance-specific procedures advance or hinder civil jus-
tice.  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. 
L. REV. 319 (2008); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the 
Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994).  Setting aside that 
debate, it remains clear that these repeated procedural interventions reflect legislators’ belief that 
malpractice cases require closer regulation and more tailored procedures than other types of claims, 
in effect creating medical malpractice “exceptionalism.”  Catherine Struve, Doctors, the Adversary 
System, and Procedural Reform in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 1015 
(2004). 
 99.  See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes. 
 100.  See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes. 
 101.  ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3, 9 (2003).  
Professor Kagan defines “adversarial legalism” as “policymaking, policy implementation, and dis-
pute resolution by means of lawyer-dominated litigation.”  Id. at 3.  It has two characteristics: “for-
mal legal contestation—competing interests and disputants readily invoke legal rights, duties, and 
procedural requirements, backed by recourse to formal law enforcement, strong legal penalties, lit-
igation and/or judicial review” and “litigant activism—a style of legal contestation in which the 
assertion of claims, the search for controlling legal arguments, and the gathering and submission of 
evidence are dominated . . . by disputing parties or interests, acting primarily through lawyers.”  Id. 
at 9.   
 102.  See infra Part II.C and accompanying notes. 
 103.  See supra Part I.B.1.  
 104.  See supra Part I.B.2.   
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The outcomes of these different ADR interventions vary in interesting 
ways.  One common result for all three processes is that they do not lower 
providers’ liability premiums. This conclusion should come as no surprise 
given the absence of a direct, causal connection between malpractice litiga-
tion costs and providers’ insurance premiums.105  Some studies do suggest, 
however, that when compared to court litigated outcomes, certain ADR pro-
cesses may in fact help more injured patients receive compensation and, in 
select cases, for greater dollar amounts.  Thus, taken together, these early 
ADR interventions did not achieve their intended effect of reducing provid-
ers’ malpractice litigation costs; instead, they may have inadvertently helped 
some patients obtain better outcomes than they would have in court. 
This Part analyzes the three ADR processes deployed by state legisla-
tures since the beginning of the tort reform movement: legislation mandating 
medical screening panels, binding arbitration, and mediation.  For each, the 
following issues are examined: 1) the structure of each ADR procedural in-
tervention, including its operation, prevalence, statutory design, and impact 
on parties’ substantive rights; 2) the policy rationale behind the ADR legis-
lation; and 3) what empirical data reveal about the impact of the ADR pro-
cess. 
A.  The First Generation: Medical Screening Panels 
One of the earliest ADR procedural interventions deployed by state leg-
islatures was the medical screening panel.106  These panels were designed to 
serve as a procedural triage tent for medical malpractice claims, allowing ex-
perts to quickly assess the merits of legal claims.107  The expectation was that 
a panel’s finding of no liability would persuade a plaintiff to abandon a claim, 
whereas a panel that found liability would incentivize defendants to settle.108  
In either scenario, the panel process aimed to divert claims away from the 
courts and malpractice litigation. 
States began passing screening panel statutes in the 1970s.  Currently, 
seventeen jurisdictions utilize a screening process for medical malpractice 
                                                          
 105.  See supra note 88. 
 106.  For an in-depth history of screening panels and their historical context, see Jean A. Mac-
chiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181 (1990), and Struve, supra note 98, at 948–75. 
 107.  My use of “triage” here follows the medical definition: “the sorting of and allocation of 
treatment to patients . . . according to a system of priorities designed to maximize the number of 
survivors.”  Triage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014).  This is somewhat different 
than how the term has been used in other areas of legal scholarship to describe how administrative 
agencies can effectively sort cases.  See, e.g., Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Procedural Triage, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 79, 83 n.11 (2015). 
 108.  Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical Malpractice, 9 
ALASKA L. REV. 429, 441 (1992). 
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claims, with panel structure and legal powers varying widely.109  Panels usu-
ally consist of a licensed physician, practicing attorney, layperson, and, in 
cases brought against a hospital, a hospital administrator.110  Statutes often 
direct the panel to issue a report for the parties that examines the underlying 
facts of the case,111 analyzes whether injuries sustained were caused by the 
medical practitioner’s substandard care,112 and, in some states, assesses the 
extent of the patient’s injury and issues an appropriate dollar amount in com-
pensation.113  Depending on the jurisdiction, appearing before a screening 
                                                          
 109.  These states include Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands.  Heather Morton, Medical Liability/Malpractice ADR and Screening Pan-
els, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 20, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-liability-malpractice-adr-and-screening-panels-
statutes.aspx (providing an index of medical liability ADR and screening panel statutes and legisla-
tion).  The terminology used to describe these panels varies too.  They are sometimes called an 
“arbitration panel” or a “mediation panel,” but function like screening panels.  Compare MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-01 to 3-2A-10 (West 2015) (using “arbitration panel”), with 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4901 to .4923 (West 2015) (using “mediation panel”). 
 110.  E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 671-11(b) (LexisNexis 2015) (“Each medical inquiry and 
conciliation panel shall consist of one chairperson who shall be an attorney licensed to practice in 
the courts of the State and experienced in trial practice and the personal injury claims settlement 
process and one physician, osteopathic physician, or surgeon licensed to practice . . . .”); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 6-1002 (West 2016) (requiring panels to include one lay person who is not a lawyer, 
doctor, or hospital employee and, for cases involving claims against a hospitals, one administrator 
at a state licensed acute care hospital).   
 111.  E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6807 (2015) (“The evidence to be considered by the med-
ical negligence review panel shall be promptly submitted . . . [and] may consist of medical charts, 
X-rays, laboratory tests, excerpts of treatises, depositions of witnesses including parties and any 
other form of evidence allowable by the medical negligence review panel.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-
18-10-22 (West 2016). 
 112.  E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (2015).  In Alaska, a panel must provide to the parties 
and the court detailed answers and explanations to the following questions:  
(1) Why did the claimant seek medical care?  (2) Was a correct diagnosis made? If not, 
what was incorrect about the diagnosis?  (3) Was the treatment or lack of treatment ap-
propriate?  If not, what was inappropriate about the treatment or lack of treatment?  (4) 
Was the claimant injured during the course of evaluation or treatment or by failure to 
diagnose or treat?  (5) If the answer to question 4 is “yes,” what is the nature and extent 
of the medical injury?  (6) What specifically caused the medical injury?  (7) Was the 
medical injury caused by unskillful care?  Explain.  (8) If a medical injury had not oc-
curred, what would have been the likely outcome of the medical case? 
Id.  
 113.  Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: An Update and Assess-
ment, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 9 (2013). 
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panel could be a condition precedent to filing in court114 or an added proce-
dural step after pleading but before discovery115—or could be waived alto-
gether.116  In essence, these screening panels operate like informal and non-
binding summary judgment, giving plaintiffs a red or green light to proceed 
forward with litigation. 
The extent to which a panel’s finding and its report impact parties’ sub-
stantive claims varies across states.  In some jurisdictions, panel reports re-
main confidential and inadmissible as evidence in any court action, although 
they could be forwarded to the provider’s state professional licensing 
board.117  In other states, the panel serves as a “civil grand jury”118 or an ex-
pert tribunal with powers to subpoena witnesses119 and whose report is for-
warded to the judge and becomes part of the court record.120  Some states use 
the panel’s finding as a carrot to entice settlement, for example, by deputizing 
screening panels to formalize settlement agreements and render them binding 
so parties can skip going to court for a final judgment and order.121  Con-
versely, the panel finding can become a stick that penalizes a plaintiff who 
chooses to continue with litigation after receiving an unfavorable panel re-
view by, for example, requiring the plaintiff to post a bond for each named 
defendant in the continuing litigation.122 
                                                          
 114.  E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-18-8-4 to 34-18-8-6 (West 2016) (requiring medical malprac-
tice claims to go to a review panel before commencing court action unless the parties agree to waive 
the panel or the plaintiff seeks less than $15,000 in damages); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-416(2) 
(LexisNexis 2015). 
 115.  E.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.2 to 581.3 (2015). 
 116.  E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. 40:1231.8(B)(1)(d) (2016). 
 117.  E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-20(d) (LexisNexis 2015).  
 118.  E.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1001 (2015). 
 119.  E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West 2016) (“The tribunal may upon the 
application of either party or upon its own decision summon or subpoena any such records or indi-
viduals to substantiate or clarify any evidence which has been presented before it and may appoint 
an impartial and qualified physician or surgeon or other related professional person or expert to 
conduct any necessary professional or expert examination of the claimant or relevant evidentiary 
matter and to report or to testify as a witness thereto.”). 
 120.  E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4904 (2015) (“(b) The screening panel shall notify all parties 
when its determination is to be handed down, and, within seven days of its decision, shall provide a 
copy of its opinion and any concurring or dissenting opinion to each party and each attorney of 
record and to the judge of the district court . . . . (c) The written report of the screening panel shall 
be admissible in any subsequent legal proceeding . . . .”). 
 121.  E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-606(2) (West 2015) (“The panel may recommend an 
award, approve settlement agreements, and discuss the settlement agreements, all in a manner con-
sistent with this part.  All approved settlement agreements are binding on the parties.”).  
 122.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4915(2) (West 2015).  The statute provides: “If the action 
proceeds to trial, the party who has been determined to have a frivolous action or defense shall post 
a cash or surety bond, approved by the court, in the amount of $5,000.00 for each party against 
whom the action or defense was determined to be frivolous.  If judgment is entered against the party 
who posted the bond, the bond shall be used to pay all reasonable costs incurred by the other parties 
and any costs allowed by law or by court rule, including court costs and reasonable attorney fees.”  
Id. 
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Mandatory pre-litigation screening panels were supposed to diminish 
providers’ liability premiums by correcting for two perceived problems: the 
high volume of lawsuits and high payouts resulting from judges’ and jurors’ 
lack of medical expertise.  New Hampshire’s medical screening statute offers 
an illustrative statement of legislative intent: 
Availability and affordability of insurance against liability for 
medical injury is essential for the protection of patients as well as 
assuring availability of and access to essential medical and hospital 
care.  This chapter affirms the intent of the general court to contain 
the costs of the medical injury reparations system and to promote 
availability and affordability of insurance against liability for 
medical injury.  Claims for medical injury should be resolved as 
early and inexpensively as possible to contain system costs.  
Claims that are resolved before court determination cost less to re-
solve than claims that must be resolved by a court.  Meritorious 
claims should be identified as quickly as possible, as should non-
meritorious claims.  Defendants should consider paying or com-
promising meritorious claims and plaintiffs should consider with-
drawing or compromising non-meritorious claims, as soon as the 
merits of the claims are known to the parties.  Presentation of 
claims to a medical review panel is intended to help identify both 
meritorious and non-meritorious claims without the delay and ex-
pense of a court trial. . . .  The panel process will encourage the 
prompt resolution of claims, because both sides will be given an 
objective view of the merits.  If the panel finds that a claim has 
merit, the defendant will be more likely to pay the claim or nego-
tiate a compromise that is favorable to the claimant. If the panel 
finds that the claim lacks merit, the claimant is more likely to with-
draw the claim or accept a nominal settlement.123 
In theory, screening panels would discourage “non-meritorious” claims 
and keep them out of courts, thereby reserving the court’s time and resources 
to litigate valid claims.124  Additionally, panels could encourage and facilitate 
an informed settlement of legally viable claims.  And lastly, in those states 
where the panel’s report entered the court record, they inserted an additional 
expert medical voice into legal proceedings, a voice not hired by one side or 
                                                          
 123.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519-B:1 (2015) (emphasis added); see also Macchiaroli, supra 
note 106, at 186–87. 
 124.  See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1514 (2015) (stating that the purpose of the act is to prevent 
nonmeritorious claims against health care providers “where the facts do not permit at least a rea-
sonable inference of malpractice,” thus allowing “the fair and equitable disposition” of “well 
founded” claims).  
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the other, so that attorneys, judges, and lay jurors’ analysis of whether negli-
gence occurred might be further informed by medical expertise.125 
Despite these hoped-for reforms, the potential benefits of screening pan-
els have not been borne out.  Empirical studies of screening panels concluded 
that they have no systematic effect on the number of claims filed or paid,126 
nor do they reduce the cost or amount of time associated with litigating med-
ical malpractice claims.127  In fact, screening panels may increase the number 
of claims that proceed to litigation by reducing plaintiffs’ costs of acquiring 
expert testimony.128  Furthermore, they may not help lower parties’ litigation 
expenses because most parties have to conduct discovery in preparation for 
the panel, thus shifting discovery costs from the litigation to the pre-litigation 
stage.129  A backlog of cases waiting for a panel can also cause delays.130  
Another possible unintended consequence of screening panels is they may 
lead to higher, rather than reduced, malpractice liability premiums for pro-
viders.  Panels screen out the claims that could have settled with a small pay-
ment and leave behind ambiguous claims that proceed to trial and necessitate 
greater expense.131 
Screening panels also prompted numerous constitutional challenges.132  
Opponents of screening panels successfully argued that requiring screening 
                                                          
 125.  Struve, supra note 98, at 988–89.  In general, many providers sued for tortious negligence 
perceive the legal system as second-guessing their judgment as medical professionals and under-
mining their professional independence.  WEILER, supra note 20, at 6.  Indeed, when challenged on 
evidentiary grounds, courts uphold screening panel reports as additional expert testimony.  Eggen, 
supra note 113, at 13–16. 
 126.  Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New 
Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 72 (1986); Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort Reforms 
on the Value of Closed Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 663 (1989). 
 127.  Frederick J. White III et al., Medical Malpractice Review Panels and Medical Liability 
System Cost, Timeliness, and Efficiency: A Cross-Sectional Study, 5 J. EMPIRICAL STUD. 375 
(2008). 
 128.  Danzon, supra note 126, at 72 (citing DANZON, supra note 44, at 198–202).  Rather than 
having to hire and pay for their own expert witnesses, plaintiffs have the benefit of the panel’s 
medical and legal experts for no, or low, cost.  This translates into significant cost savings; even on 
the defense side, paying for experts constitutes anywhere from a quarter to almost a half of the total 
cost of defending a malpractice claim.  Aaron E. Carroll et al., The Impact of Defense Expenses in 
Medical Malpractice Claims, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 135, 140 (2012). 
 129.  White III et al., supra note 127, at 377 (citing Catherine S. Meschievitz, Efficacious or 
Precarious? Comments on the Processing and Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims in the 
United States, 3 ANNALS HEALTH L. 123, 136 (1994); Dennis J. Rasor, Mandatory Medical Mal-
practice Screening Panels: A Need to Reevaluate, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 115, 122 (1993)). 
 130.  Nicole L. Kaufman, The Demise of Medical Malpractice Screening Panels and Alternative 
Solutions Based on Trust and Honesty, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 247, 256 (2007). 
 131.  Sloan et al., supra note 126, at 677. 
 132.  States where screening panel systems have been repealed or invalidated include Arizona, 
Illinois, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, and Wyoming.  Catherine T. Struve, Improving the Medical Malpractice Litigation Pro-
cess, 23 HEALTH AFF. 33, 35 n.8 (2004). 
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panels specifically for medical malpractice claims violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the U.S. Constitution by impermissibly discriminating among 
different classes of legal claims.133  In jurisdictions where the state constitu-
tion provides for an open and publicly available judiciary, critics of screening 
panels have argued, with mixed results, that panels create arbitrary delays 
and financial burdens that effectively block citizens’ constitutional rights to 
access the courts.134 
Thus, from a reform standpoint, screening panels have not been a suc-
cessful experiment.  They did not fix the perceived problems of excessive 
litigation and providers’ liability insurance costs and, while many statutes 
authorizing the panels remain on the books, they have largely fallen into dis-
use.135  Furthermore, because screening panels operate within the frame of 
medical malpractice litigation, the fundamental problems with the conven-
tional tort system go unaddressed.  Screening panels have not been shown to 
help more injured patients receive compensation for their injuries, improve 
communication, or enable providers and patients to prevent future mistakes 
in medical treatment. 
B.  The Second Generation: Binding Arbitration 
Binding arbitration presents another ADR process that state legislatures 
hoped would reduce medical malpractice litigation costs.  Unlike medical 
screening panels, states do not statutorily compel parties to utilize binding 
arbitration136; rather, the parties are supposed to elect, by private contract, to 
use binding arbitration.137  However, states enacted legislation authorizing 
                                                          
 133.  Eggen, supra note 113, at 11 (discussing the 1983 decision of the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court in Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 93 (R.I. 1983), and the 1988 decision of the Wyoming 
Supreme Court in Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 783 (Wyo. 1988)). 
 134.  Id. at 12 (citing State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem’l Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 
S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (holding that screening panels violate the state’s constitution by imposing 
procedure as a precondition to access the courts)); cf. State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 
434 (Wis. 1978) (finding that mandatory screening panels do not violate equal protection or due 
process nor do they constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial authority). 
 135.  Jona Goldschmidt, Where Have All the Panels Gone? A History of the Arizona Medical 
Liability Review Panel, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1013 (1991).  Most parties waive out of panels because 
plaintiff attorneys already screened their cases and think the case should proceed to litigation.  See, 
e.g., Bob Sanders, Questions Swirl Around Effectiveness of Medical Malpractice Panels, N.H. BUS. 
REV. (Feb. 7, 2014) http://www.nhbr.com/February-7-2014/Questions-swirl-around-effectiveness-
of-medical-malpractice-panels/. 
 136.  Cf. 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 10100–10147 (2015) (mandating binding arbitration for med-
ical malpractice claims).  Some states require courts to refer civil cases to non-binding arbitration 
as a case management and settlement tool.  See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 601-20 (LexisNexis 
2015). 
 137.  Scholars often refer to this “private ordering” as “mandatory arbitration” to signal the lack 
of genuine, voluntary election by both parties to arbitrate.  See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Proce-
dural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 728, 751 n.112 (2011) (courts increasingly enforce 
private contracts that defy fundamental norms of procedure); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Or-
dering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976). 
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providers and patients to contract for binding arbitration and, in a limited 
number of jurisdictions, attempted to regulate the enforceability of contract 
terms.138 
Binding arbitration operates like private adjudication.  Unlike other 
forms of ADR, arbitration is not designed to induce voluntary settlement be-
fore trial but instead to side-step litigation altogether by vesting full deci-
sionmaking power in private hands.139  Arbitrators make decisions based on 
the facts presented by the parties and the legal merits of the case.140  In the 
case of an alleged malpractice incident, an arbitrator determines whether or 
not a standard of care was met, assigns fault, and awards damages in com-
pensation.141 
Initially designed as a way for sophisticated parties to manage their busi-
ness disputes quickly, arbitration allowed contracting parties to waive their 
right to trial and instead have their dispute decided by a private person, or 
panel of persons, from which there are limited rights to appeal.142  However, 
the application of arbitration has expanded dramatically over time, and the 
extent to which patients, and many other consumers, knowingly and volun-
tarily elect to arbitrate remains an open question.143  In the medical context, 
                                                          
 138.  Irving Ladimer & Joel Solomon, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Laws, Programs, 
Cases, 1977 INS. L.J. 335, 337–39.  
 139.  Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Con-
stitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 768 (1977). 
 140.  Kenneth A. DeVille, The Jury is Out: Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration Agreements for 
Medical Malpractice Claims, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 333–39 (2007).  Parties can agree on which 
procedures to use, for example how facts will be gathered and presented to the arbitrator, and which 
substantive law will govern the dispute.  See, e.g., AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION SERV., RULES OF PROCEDURE AND GUIDE TO ARBITRATION CLAUSES (2014), 
https://www.healthlawyers.org/dr/Pages/default.aspx. 
 141.  Metzloff, supra note 71, at 204.  Many arbitration agreements designate a private organi-
zation to handle the arbitration, such as the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), National 
Arbitration Forum (“NAF”), Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”), or American 
Health Lawyers Association (“AHLA”), all of which have procedural rules and indicate which sub-
stantive and procedural law governs.  DeVille, supra note 140, at 337–38; Ann H. Nevers, Medical 
Malpractice Arbitration in the New Millennium: Much Ado About Nothing?, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. 
L.J. 45, 84–87 (2000)).  
 142.  Metzloff, supra note 71, at 204.  In theory, parties can agree to use arbitration at any point 
along the evolution of the dispute, from before the dispute arises all the way to the moment before 
a jury trial.  Id. at 204 n.5.  
 143.  See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 55 (2004); Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: 
An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1 
(2015).  In late 2015, the New York Times published a three-part series on the prevalence of man-
datory arbitration.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking 
the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/busi-
ness/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html; Jessica Silver-Greenberg 
& Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a “Privatization of the Justice System”, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-
the-justice-system.html; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration, 
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some agreements to arbitrate are presented in the paperwork patients com-
plete before seeing a provider, in hospital admission materials, or in the en-
rollment documents individuals receive when they sign up for health insur-
ance.144  Patients may not be aware that when they sign these documents, they 
are agreeing to arbitrate in the event they suffer an injury during treatment. 
States enacted legislation promoting arbitration of malpractice claims 
and guiding parties on how to contract for this alternative to court litiga-
tion.145  Some jurisdictions explicitly authorized parties to use arbitration for 
medical malpractice claims and provided guidance on how to draft arbitration 
clauses to ensure their enforceability.146  Other state statutes directed mal-
practice defendants who are willing to concede liability to inform the plaintiff 
and then use arbitration to determine damages.147 
In other jurisdictions, statutes attempt to regulate binding arbitration 
contract formation.  For example, some statutes refuse to enforce arbitration 
agreements signed as a precondition to receiving healthcare,148 while other 
statutes only validate arbitration agreements signed after the dispute arose 
and in the presence of the patient’s attorney.149  States also attempt to control 
                                                          
Scripture is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/busi-
ness/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html. 
 144.  DeVille, supra note 140, at 333, 335; Elizabeth Rolph et al., Arbitration Agreements in 
Health Care: Myths and Reality, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 154 (1997). 
 145.  States shy away from directly mandating parties to binding arbitration because of consti-
tutional due process concerns, an issue vigorously argued in the literature but that lies beyond the 
scope of this paper.  See generally, HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 92-228A, TORT 
REFORM: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REQUIRING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1992); 
Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding 
Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 
72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997).   
 146.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.9 to 1295 (West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-64-403(1) (West 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-3 (2016).  For an informative and 
much expanded discussion of California’s approach to binding arbitration, see Rolph et al., supra 
note 144, at 161–68. 
 147.  See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-a (MCKINNEY 2015); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3045 
(McKinney 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106 (2015). 
 148.  See, e.g., 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/8 (West 2016).  These limits are likely preempted 
unless limited to insurance, where there is reverse preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  
Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse Preemption of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 264 (2005). 
 149.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-62 (West 2015) (“However, no agreement to arbitrate shall 
be enforceable unless the agreement was made subsequent to the alleged malpractice and after a 
dispute or controversy has occurred and unless the claimant is represented by an attorney at law at 
the time the agreement is entered into.”).  For a discussion of Federal Arbitration Act preemption 
and the Georgia statute, see Ellwood F. Oakley, III, The Next Generation of Medical Malpractice 
Dispute Resolution: Alternatives to Litigation, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 993, 994–99 (2005). 
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the process of privately contracted binding arbitration by mandating how dis-
covery will be conducted,150 which rules of evidence apply,151 and the amount 
arbitrators may award.152 
It remains unclear what motivates legislatures’ efforts to regulate the 
time, place, and manner of medical malpractice arbitration contracts.  Some 
statutes seem designed to protect arbitration agreements from challenge 
while others seem to reflect a desire to protect vulnerable consumers.153  For 
example, a particular consumer protection concern is that patients are not 
well positioned to negotiate effectively with providers.154  In fact, no real ne-
gotiation occurs, let alone knowing and voluntary agreement, if patients 
simply sign arbitration clauses included in the stack of paperwork requiring 
signature at the doctor’s office or hospital.155  Notwithstanding state efforts 
to rein in, or even guide, privately contracted binding arbitration agreements, 
these statutes likely would not hold up if challenged under federal preemption 
doctrine,156 as states like Texas recently discovered.157 
                                                          
 150.  See, e.g., 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/11 (West 2016) (mandating parties with binding 
arbitration agreements to follow discovery rules in the Uniform Arbitration Act). 
 151.  See, e.g., id. at 15/12 (mandating parties follow the state’s rules of evidence in binding 
arbitration). 
 152.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70A.060(2) (West 2015) (limiting arbitrators’ awards to $1 
million in economic and noneconomic damages). 
 153.  The tension between protecting individuals’ liberty rights to contract freely, on one hand, 
and ensuring those contracts in fact advance societal values of justice and fairness, on the other 
hand, is baked into arbitration.  For more discussion of this problem, see Richard C. Reuben, De-
mocracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 
281 (2004) (analyzing arbitration through the lens of democracy theory). 
 154.  Even among native English speakers, disparities in literacy between providers and patients 
pose a challenge, as basic healthcare materials are written above a tenth-grade level, whereas most 
adults read at eighth grade levels.  Richard S. Safeer & Jann Keenan, Health Literacy: The Gap 
Between Physicians and Patients, 72 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 463, 463 (2005).   
 155.  SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 38, at 310.  Some states also tried to protect providers from 
being pressured to use arbitration contracts by their insurance liability providers.  See, e.g., COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403(1) (West 2016).  Despite state efforts to ensure binding arbitration 
agreements are not contracts of adhesion for any party, the likelihood that such restrictions will hold 
up under current federal preemption analysis appears unlikely.  For an analysis of U.S. Supreme 
Court doctrine governing Federal Arbitration Act preemption, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal 
Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004).  For an expanded discussion of ADR and 
contracts of adhesion, see Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1593 (2005). 
 156.  Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Prefer-
ence for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 660–74 (1996); see also Doctor’s Assocs., 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that a Montana state law invalidating any arbitration 
agreement that did not have an all-caps and underlined notice on the first page of the contract as 
inconsonant with the Federal Arbitration Act because it only targets arbitration clauses and not all 
contracts and is therefore preempted by the federal law); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Uncon-
scionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001 (1996).  
 157.  Fredericksburg Care Co., L.P. v. Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2014) (holding that the FAA 
preempted Texas state law setting out format and notice requirements for patient-provider arbitra-
tion agreements (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.451 (West 2015)). 
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The policy rationale behind authorizing binding arbitration of medical 
malpractice disputes mirrors that of screening panels yet, also similar to 
screening panels, a subsequent reduction in liability costs has not been borne 
out in practice.  Legislators hoped that diverting malpractice cases away from 
litigation and instead to private arbitral adjudication would, in theory, reduce 
parties’ expenditures of time and money, employ decisionmakers with 
greater subject-matter expertise than judges and juries, and provide privacy 
to patients and providers.158 
But empirical studies of outcomes in private, binding arbitration indi-
cate that it has not resulted in the intended effect legislators hoped for: greater 
efficiency and reduced medical liability system costs.  For example, one 
study found that, contrary to the intended outcome, medical malpractice in-
surance premiums went up, not down, in jurisdictions with statutes permit-
ting binding arbitration of claims.159  Another study found that laws permit-
ting binding arbitration correlated with an increase in the frequency of 
medical malpractice claims, both filed and paid out, particularly for small 
claims that likely would not be brought to court due to the prohibitive cost of 
court litigation.160  A third study comparing outcomes of litigated and arbi-
trated claims found that patients who suffered permanent disabilities pre-
vailed more frequently in arbitration than in litigation and that damages 
awards for permanent disabilities were higher in arbitration than in litiga-
tion.161  Thus, total liability costs appear to increase with arbitration, although 
the payouts are spread among a greater number of claims.162 
Despite these outcomes, maybe even because of them, binding arbitra-
tion of medical malpractice claims is not widespread.  Providers may per-
ceive that greater payouts lead to higher liability costs and, perhaps as a con-
sequence, do not widely use binding arbitration clauses in healthcare 
                                                          
 158.  Metzloff, supra note 71, at 208–10 (noting that litigation expenses often exceed compen-
sation paid to injured patients); DeVille, supra note 140, at 340 (attributing costs savings to expe-
dited hearing schedules, truncated and limited scope of discovery, and less formal evidentiary rules); 
Ladimer & Solomon, supra note 138, at 353 (citing survey results from R.L. Peck, Binding Mal-
practice Arbitration: Most Doctors Are for It, MED. ECON. (Apr. 4, 1977)).  
 159.  Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance “Crisis” of the 1970s: An 
Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 629, 636, 639–40 (1985); see also Stephen 
Zuckerman et al., Effects of Tort Reforms and Other Factors on Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Premiums, 27 INQUIRY 167, 176 (1990) (finding that procedural tort reforms, such as mandatory 
screening panels or encouragement of binding arbitration, had no significant effect on providers’ 
malpractice liability premiums with the exception of obstetric/gynecologic specialists). 
 160.  Danzon, supra note 126, at 72.  A study of malpractice claims in Florida between 1990 and 
2008 found that arbitration was used to resolve cases with less severe injuries that often involved 
issues of monitoring and diagnosis.  Mirya Holman et al., Most Claims Settle: Implications for Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution from a Profile of Medical-Malpractice Claims in Florida, 74 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 120–22 (2011). 
 161.  WEILER, supra note 20, at 102 (citing Irving Ladimer et al., Experience in Medical Mal-
practice Arbitration, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 433 (1981)).  
 162.  Danzon, supra note 126, at 77. 
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contracts.163  While some patients may fare better in arbitration than in tradi-
tional tort litigation, uncertainty continues about whether arbitration under-
mines consumer protection in the healthcare context.164  Critics further argue 
that arbitration perpetuates the same problems inherent to litigation—cost, 
adversarialism, the evidentiary challenges of proving fault—just in a differ-
ent setting.165 
C.  The Third Generation: Mediation 
Mandatory mediation is the third generation of ADR procedural inter-
ventions deployed to reform the medical malpractice system.166  In mandating 
parties to attend mediation, some policymakers hoped mediation would help 
focus settlement discussions, make them better informed and more efficient, 
and ultimately lead to out-of-court resolution of medical malpractice 
claims.167  In contrast to earlier ADR interventions, mediation offers the first 
                                                          
 163.  Elizabeth S. Rolph et al., Arbitration Agreements in Healthcare: Myths and Reality, 60 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 153, 171 (1997); Edward A. Dauer, Postscript on Health Care Dispute 
Resolution: Conflict Management and the Role of Culture, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1029, 1036–37 
(2005) (reporting on the surprisingly low number of malpractice cases that actually go to arbitra-
tion).  Managed care organizations like Kaiser Permanente require arbitration for all malpractice 
claims, although its program has not gone without challenge.  For discussion and analysis, see Alan 
B. Morrison, Can Mandatory Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims Be Fair? The Kaiser Per-
manente System, 70 DISP. RESOL. J. 35, 59 (2015), and Gary T. Schwartz, Medical Malpractice, 
Tort, Contract, and Managed Care, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 885, 903, 905–07. 
 164.  Deville, supra note 140, at 366–74; Metzloff, supra note 71, at 210–21.  Pre-dispute bind-
ing arbitration has a number of built-in characteristics that advantage defendant providers and dis-
advantage patients: patients may not understand what they are agreeing to when they sign arbitration 
agreements; they may not be able to secure legal representation for arbitration and therefore have 
to make their own case against repeat player defense attorneys; they have to cover arbitration fees 
up front; and they face an abbreviated discovery process that may make it harder to prove their 
claim and a limited right of appeal.  Id.  
 165.  Metzloff, supra note 71, at 215–16. 
 166.  Mediation or some form of facilitated settlement process is required by statute for medical 
malpractice claims in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Nevada, New York, 
Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington.  Vermont statute sets out a procedure for pre-suit medi-
ation but does not make participation mandatory.  Excluded from this list are screening panel pro-
grams like those in Michigan that are confusingly called “mediation.”  A statutory mandate is not 
required for mediation, however, and many jurisdictions also send civil claims to mediation pursu-
ant to court rules.  Morton, supra note 109. 
 167.  The reason for requiring mediation for malpractice cases in Connecticut was “litigation 
avoidance.”  An Act Concerning Adverse Events at Hospitals an Out Patient Surgical Facilities, 
Discussion of Senate Amendment Schedule B to S.B. 248, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 
May 1, 2010) (statement of Sen. Andrew J. McDonald) (“One of the things that we have been trying 
to encourage in this state is litigation avoidance strategies . . . this [law] will be yet another effort in 
our ongoing efforts to alleviate or reduce the amount of needless litigation, particularly in the area 
of medical malpractice.”).  For a discussion of mediation as a forum for legal negotiations, see Craig 
A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fair-
ness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1379–85 (1995); Robert A. Baruch Bush, What 
Do We Need a Mediator For?: Mediation’s “Value-Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. DISP. 
RESOL. 1 (1996). 
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procedural reform aimed to address the communication barriers between pro-
viders and patients as a secondary objective after reducing litigation costs. 
As an ADR process, mediation is fundamentally different from both 
screening panels and binding arbitration.  In the medical malpractice litiga-
tion setting, mediation usually unfolds as an informal, confidential settlement 
negotiation.  The parties and their lawyers engage in settlement discussions 
facilitated by a neutral third-party mediator.168  Although participation may 
be mandatory, agreeing to settle the case is voluntary; the parties themselves 
determine the terms of a settlement agreement and choose to be bound it.  
Typically, the confidentiality of mediation discussions makes them inadmis-
sible in any future court proceedings. 
Statutes mandating medical malpractice mediation sometimes include 
specific instructions to encourage settlement.  For example, some jurisdic-
tions mandate mediation as a condition precedent to filing a claim in court, 
often in conjunction with laws requiring specialized notice and informal dis-
covery requirements.169  Other jurisdictions mandate mediation after filing 
but before formal discovery or trial.170  State statutes may also instruct parties 
to submit statements to the mediator explaining the issues in the case, the 
parties’ positions, and information that would narrow the scope of the dispute 
before the mediation occurs.171 
Thus, mandatory mediation in the medical liability context imposes a 
less indelible impact on parties’ substantive claims than screening panels and 
binding arbitration.  While some mediators may recommend a settlement, 
suggest a settlement amount, or evaluate the strength of parties’ legal posi-
tions,172 the mediator has no legal authority to impose a decision on parties 
or to give the plaintiff a green light to proceed with litigation.173  If any claim 
is settled in mediation, parties must mutually agree not only to the content of 
settlement terms, but also to be bound by them. 
                                                          
 168.  Mediation is a flexible process and looks very different based on its context.  Lydia Nuss-
baum, Mediation as Regulation: Expanding State Governance Over Private Disputes, 2016 UTAH 
L. REV. 361.  For a description of how medical malpractice cases are conducted in one jurisdiction, 
see Ralph Peeples et al., Following the Script: An Empirical Analysis of Court-Ordered Mediation 
of Medical Malpractice Cases, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, and Thomas B. Metzloff et al., Empirical 
Perspectives on Mediation and Malpractice, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (1997). 
 169.  See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-79-120, 15-79-125 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 766.106 (2016). 
For an expanded discussion of Florida’s multi-tiered sequence of ADR processes for malpractice 
claims, see Holman et al., supra note 160, at 103, 106–07. 
 170.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190c (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.100 (West 
2013). 
 171.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2825 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7012(c) (West 2015).  
 172.  Metzloff et al., supra note 168, at 121–23. 
 173.  This is true even in jurisdictions that enable, or require, the judge overseeing the case to be 
the mediator.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190c(c).  
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The policy rationale for mandating mediation of medical malpractice 
claims is to enable settlement of claims with limited court involvement,174 an 
objective not unique to medical malpractice cases alone.175  Mediation is in-
expensive for courts because parties usually bear the cost of the mediator.  
Mediation also requires fewer court administrative resources than other 
forms of ADR, such as screening panels.176  Attaching pre-suit notice and 
informal discovery requirements to the mediation process can help correct 
information asymmetry problems, which are particularly acute in medical 
malpractice cases, and lead to more informed settlement discussions.177  In 
addition, and in notable contrast to previous generations of ADR that de-
pended on litigation to provide information, advocates of mediation in the 
medical malpractice context posit that mediation now enables injured pa-
tients and their families to obtain a more detailed explanation of what went 
wrong, and why.178  Mediation creates a confidential forum for the defendant 
to offer an apology179 or make benevolent gestures without fear these actions 
will later be used in court.180 
Despite the potential for mediation to serve as a “safe harbor with ther-
apeutic potential . . . to address the source as well as the consequence” of the 
                                                          
 174.  Phil Mendelson, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary for the District of Columbia, 
explained that the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 2006, which includes mandatory pre-file 
mediation and the inadmissibility of certain benevolent gestures, was designed to:  
[E]ncourage early settlements and facilitate the parties’ ability to reach a settlement.  Set-
tlements, especially ones accomplished early in the litigation process, lower each party’s 
individual costs (providing cost savings that can be spread to the general public through 
less costly insurance rates), and promote judicial economy by decreasing the time and 
money spent by the court on these complicated and contentious issues . . . .  A statement 
of public policy that honest and open communication between the parties will diffuse the 
adversarial environment oftentimes resorted to in today’s litigious society. 
PHIL MENDELSON, COUNCIL OF D.C. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 16-418, THE 
“MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM ACT OF 2006,” 1–2 (2006).  
 175.  See, e.g., ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 50–67 (2004). 
 176.  Metzloff et al., supra note 168, at 109.  
 177.  Frank A. Sloan & Thomas J. Hoerger, Uncertainty, Information and Resolution of Medical 
Malpractice Disputes, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 403, 404 (1991). 
 178.  Chris Stern Hyman et al., Interest-Based Mediation of Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: A 
Route to Improved Patient Safety?, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 797, 800–01 (2010); Eric Galton, 
Mediation of Medical Negligence Claims, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 321 (2000) (noting that mediation 
can “heal” the dysfunctional communication common in medical negligence lawsuits, giving parties 
opportunities to express regret, gain closure, and restore a previously valued relationship). 
 179.  Ellen Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency 
or Crucial Predictability, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 80–81 (2001) (stating that confidentiality in medi-
ation enables free and “forthright” communication between adversaries by, among other things, 
eliminating the fear that such communications will be used in future litigation).   
 180.  For example, the District of Columbia established its mandatory mediation requirement for 
medical malpractice claims, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2821 (West 2017), as a portion of a larger Med-
ical Malpractice Amendment Act, 2006 D.C. Sess. Law. Serv. 16-263 (West), which also rendered 
“benevolent gestures” made by a provider to a victim, or victim’s family, inadmissible as evidence 
of admission of liability.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2841 (West 2017).  
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patient’s claim,181 the model of mediation most frequently employed may not 
realize this potential.  In practice, medical negligence mediations focus pri-
marily on the financial element of the case, employing a “single-axis, con-
ventional negotiation over the settlement amount,”182 rather than also ad-
dressing non-monetary interests.183  And, there may not be an opportunity for 
a meaningful apology between the parties, as providers may not attend set-
tlement negotiations themselves.184  Nonparticipation by the provider under-
mines the additional benefits that can come from direct communication: 
When defendant physicians do not participate in mediations, those 
physicians, the defendant hospitals, the plaintiff patients and fam-
ilies, and the general population of patients all lose.  Non-partici-
pation of defendant physicians leads to a loss of the opportunity for 
patients and physicians to reconcile, loss of the opportunity for the 
physician to be forgiven and for the patient or family to forgive, 
loss of the opportunity for the physician and family members to 
forgive themselves, loss of the opportunity for information giving 
and gathering, and loss of the opportunity to consider changes in 
institutional policies and practices.185 
Although mediation advocates identify many benefits from using medi-
ation to address patient injuries, empirically demonstrating a direct impact of 
mandatory mediation on malpractice litigation costs proves elusive.  Re-
searchers studying mediation of malpractice claims note that some cases set-
tle during the mediation session but many others settle later or are dropped 
by the plaintiff.186  However, it is difficult to know whether a case ultimately 
settled because of information exchanged in the mediation or whether the 
                                                          
 181.  Dauer & Marcus, supra note 58, at 199. 
 182.  Dauer, supra note 163, at 1037. 
 183.  Galton, supra note 178, at 324 (noting that lawyer-mediators often feel pressured to ex-
clude non-monetary issues and to focus only on the financial negotiation that will settle the case).  
 184.  See Carol B. Liebman, Medical Malpractice Mediation: Benefits Gained, Opportunities 
Lost, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 136–38 (2011) (describing two studies of medical mal-
practice mediation in which not a single physician participated in the mediations); Jennifer K. Rob-
bennolt, The Effects of Negotiated and Delegated Apologies in Settlement Negotiation, 37 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 128, 129–31 (2013) (noting that the results of an empirical study found that apologies 
given in the civil litigation setting were less effective when delivered by an attorney on behalf of a 
wrongdoer than when delivered directly by the wrongdoer).  For a discussion of the psychology 
surrounding apology in torts, see generally Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Reasonableness: 
Some Implications of Psychology for Torts, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 489 (2010). 
 185.  Id. at 140–41. 
 186.  Metzloff et al., supra note 168, at 134–35 (finding that of 202 cases actually mediated 
during a two year period, only 50 cases were fully or partially resolved at the mediation itself, 45 
were subsequently tried, 6 were resolved by summary judgment or motions to dismiss, 68 were 
settled or voluntarily dismissed, 23 were dropped by the plaintiff, and 10 were still pending before 
conclusion of the study).  
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mediation served as just one step in a larger settlement process.187  Given the 
challenge of knowing how responsible a mediation session was for a subse-
quent settlement, it remains unknown how the frequency of mediated settle-
ments and parties’ costs compare to litigation outcomes. 
Some lessons can be gleaned, however, from the experience of hospital 
systems with their own, private in-house mediation programs.  These hospi-
tals report that, in comparison to traditional litigation, mediated claims were 
resolved faster, considerably lowered providers’ legal expenses, and allowed 
claimants to retain a greater percentage of the settlements paid due to reduced 
attorneys’ fees.188  However, the reduction in time and cost could be because 
the hospital programs are used for cases in which the provider takes respon-
sibility for the incident up front, rendering the mediation a negotiation over 
compensation rather than an argument over proving liability.189 
*        *        * 
Lawmakers used ADR legislation to alter the process of malpractice lit-
igation based upon the mistaken belief that reducing malpractice litigation 
costs would decrease providers’ liability insurance premiums.  These exper-
iments with ADR procedural interventions had little-to-no proven effect on 
liability insurance premiums.  One reason ADR procedural reforms failed to 
have their intended impact is because policymakers misidentified unmerito-
rious claims and irrational jury awards as the underlying problems with the 
medical malpractice system.190  While the incidence of malpractice litigation 
has decreased since the 1970s,191 studies indicate that limits on damages, not 
new ADR procedures, are primarily responsible.192 
                                                          
 187.  Holman et al., supra note 160, at 132; Metzloff et al., supra note 168, at 135–39; Peeples 
et al., supra note 168, at 117. 
 188.  Randall C. Jenkins et al., Mandatory Presuit Mediation: 5-Year Results of a Medical Mal-
practice Resolution Program, 33 J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. 15 (2014) (reporting that a study of 
a mandatory mediation program used in University of Florida Health System hospitals showed that, 
compared to litigation, claims were resolved eighty-one percent faster, providers’ health costs were 
ninety percent lower, claimants retained thirty-four percent more of the settlement amount).  Chi-
cago’s Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center began a voluntary mediation program in 1995 
and found similar benefits: ninety percent of claims settle and, compared to litigation, defense costs 
were reduced by more than half.  Max Douglas Brown, Rush Model Can Allow Risk Managers to 
Control Litigation Costs, 22 J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. 19 (2002).  
 189.  Dauer, supra note 163, at 1037. 
 190.  These causes have been debunked by social scientists and economists.  See VIDMAR & 
HANS, supra note 88, at 321–38; Studdert et al., Claims, supra note 48, at 2024, 2032.  
 191.  CYNTHIA G. LEE & ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 1, 5 (2011) (finding that medical malpractice law-
suits are uncommon, juries decide against plaintiffs more than seventy-five percent of the time, and 
damages are proportionate to severity of injury).  
 192.  SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 38, at 104–05 (“After three decades of experience with state 
tort reform and evaluations covering a period almost as long, the key finding is that only damage 
caps have consistently affected various outcomes of interest, including claim frequency and sever-
ity, medical malpractice premiums, and physician supply.”). 
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These early ADR interventions did not target the profound flaws in the 
tort system itself, discussed in Part I, such as the significant numbers of pa-
tients burdened with the cost of healthcare injuries, poor communication be-
tween patients and providers, and ineffective deterrence of healthcare mis-
takes.  Medical screening panels address none of these problems inherent to 
the tort system.  Although empirical evidence suggests that binding arbitra-
tion may have the modest effect of helping more injured patients receive 
compensation than they would in court litigation, the process still requires 
patients first to know enough to bring a tort claim and then to prove negli-
gence.  And while mediation can provide an opportunity for parties to talk to 
one another confidentially, the potential benefits are undermined by party 
nonparticipation and adversarial discussions focused on proving fault.193  
Thus, because these ADR processes all work within the flawed tort litigation 
framework, previous state legislative experiments with ADR have not 
yielded positive substantive reforms.  A new ADR experiment, however, at-
tempts to construct a process that uses neither the legal norms nor the adver-
sarial process of the conventional tort system. 
III.  USING ADR TO IMPLEMENT NEW REFORM OBJECTIVES: 
TRANSPARENCY & COMMUNICATION 
The shortcomings of previous ADR experiments have not deterred pol-
icymakers.  To the contrary, even more radical experimentation with ADR as 
a reform tool has emerged in the past decade.  Instead of the earlier “mal-
practice insurance crisis” narrative, with its mission to curb litigation and re-
strict patients’ access to courts, the latest ADR reform efforts emphasize a 
different goal: improving patient safety.194  These new ADR processes, re-
ferred to collectively as Communication and Resolution Programs (“CRPs”), 
attempt to change how patients and providers interact after an adverse health 
incident.  CRPs prioritize transparency over secrecy with a focus on prevent-
ing system errors rather than finding individual fault.195  They seek to include, 
rather than exclude, all parties impacted by a medical injury, thereby posi-
tioning parties as collaborators rather than adversaries.  This approach is 
                                                          
 193.  Dauer, supra note 37, at 300–05 (explaining that mediation could allow broader discus-
sions than the “‘only-money-or-no-money’ remedy” of tort liability and improve the malpractice 
system’s deterrence feedback loop but it would require overcoming significant institutional obsta-
cles). 
 194.  Studdert et al., supra note 85, at 283, 287 (discussing the two conflicting cultures of mal-
practice law and patient safety). 
 195.  CRPs derive largely from a process used by hospital risk management units.  Steve S. Kra-
man & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May Be the Best Policy, 131 ANN. 
INTERN. MED. 963, 963 (1999) (“[R]isk management usually refers to self-protective activities 
meant to prevent real or potential threats of financial loss due to accident, injury, or medical mal-
practice.”).  The earliest CRPs were used in veterans’ hospitals, most notably the Veterans Affairs 
Medical Center at Lexington, Kentucky, which began its program in 1987.  Id. at 964. 
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unique because it has the potential to address problems inherent to the tort 
system in ways that previous generations of ADR did not.  Reform advocates 
hope these new processes will address the problems of uncompensated pa-
tient injuries, poor communication between patients and providers, and the 
missed opportunities to deter future medical mistakes.196 
This Part explains the history and goals of the patient safety movement 
and then contrasts a corrective justice model inspired by patient safety norms 
with the traditional tort-based malpractice system.  It then discusses the im-
portant role ADR plays in operationalizing the alternative corrective justice 
model envisioned by the patient safety movement. 
A.  The Patient Safety Movement 
Despite the power of modern medicine to cure disease and prolong life, 
those powers remain constrained by human fallibility.  A significant number 
of people in the United States suffer serious injury and death from mistakes 
made during the course of their medical treatment.197  While this information 
was available for decades, it went unappreciated in mainstream medical mal-
practice reform debates until the IOM released its disconcerting 1999 report 
describing widespread errors in medical care, To Err Is Human.198 
To Err Is Human brought into sharp relief key problems in the 
healthcare delivery system.  Drawing on the studies of medical injury rates 
and malpractice claims discussed earlier,199 the report pronounced medical 
errors a leading cause of death and injury in the United States and estimated 
these errors cost tens of billions of dollars annually.200  The IOM reported 
that between 44,000 and 98,000 people die each year from preventable med-
ical errors, an estimate that subsequent studies have shown to be far too 
low.201  The report issued a call to action, denouncing the status quo as unac-
ceptable, unethical, and intolerable, and outlined a series of recommendations 
                                                          
 196.  See infra Parts III.A–III.B. 
 197.  See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 198.  INST. OF MED., supra note 1.  To Err is Human found the incidence of preventable errors 
in medical care was much higher than generally accepted—and even it relied on outdated statistics.  
For history and context of the report, see Mello & Brennan, supra note 12, at 1595–96.  For an 
analysis of how the rhetoric of medical malpractice changed after publication of the IOM report, 
see Henry Thomas Stelfox et al., The “To Err Is Human” Report and the Patient Safety Literature, 
15 QUALITY & SAFETY IN HEALTHCARE 174 (2006)). 
 199.  See supra Part I.B.1 and accompanying notes. 
 200.  INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 26, 40–42. 
 201.  Part of what was shocking about the IOM’s estimate was that it placed death from prevent-
able medical injury above other, more recognized causes of death, such as motor vehicle accidents, 
breast cancer, and AIDS.  Id. at 26 (citing CDC vital statistics).  More recent empirical data indicate 
even higher numbers of preventable injuries and deaths.  See Brennan et al., supra note 44; Leape 
et al., supra note 44; Eric J. Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent 
Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261 (2000) (discussing the 1984 Harvard Medical 
Practice Study and the 1992 Colorado and Utah study); see also supra notes 2–3. 
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to enable providers to learn from errors and ultimately improve patient 
safety.202 
After the IOM issued this report, voices in the medical malpractice re-
form debate began asking how best to prevent errors in the healthcare deliv-
ery system and improve the quality of healthcare.203  Many scholars, provid-
ers, and policymakers embraced this movement, often termed the “patient 
safety movement,” in calling for a complete reimagining of the medical mal-
practice system.204  Even then-Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack 
Obama co-authored a bill in 2006 to address the inadequacy of the tort system 
for preventing medical errors and compensating injured patients.205  They 
pointed out that the current medical malpractice regime “jeopardizes patient 
safety by creating an intimidating liability environment,” and called for a new 
system of disclosure and early communication that would address preventa-
ble medical injuries and provide patients compensation in a less adversarial 
manner.206  Today, even the American Medical Association, long an advocate 
of the earlier reform policies designed to limit malpractice litigation, supports 
exploring alternatives to tort litigation.207  Thus, the revelations of the patient 
safety movement spurred new approaches to medical liability reform and a 
search for dispute resolution models to deliver these reforms.208  And, yet 
                                                          
 202.  INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 203.  William M. Sage, Malpractice Reform as a Health Policy Problem, in MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 31, 31–33.  
 204.  Lucian L. Leape, Scope of Problem and History of Patient Safety, 35 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY CLINICS OF N. AM. 1, 3–5 (2008) (describing the history of the patient safety move-
ment, including influential organizations, studies, and reports); Robert M. Wachter, Patient Safety 
at Ten: Unmistakable Progress, Troubling Gaps, 29 HEALTH AFF. 165 (2010) (explaining how the 
scope of the patient safety movement has broadened since it began).  The Patient Safety has also 
gone global, with the World Health Organization’s “World Alliance for Patient Safety.”  World 
Alliance for Patient Safety, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/pa tientsafety/worldalli-
ance/en/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2016). 
 205.  National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation Act, S. 1784, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(also referred to as the “National MEDiC Act”). 
 206.  Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack Obama, Making Patient Safety the Centerpiece of Med-
ical Liability Reform, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2206–08 (2006). 
 207.  AM. MED. ASS’N, ADVOCACY RESOURCE CENTER, EARLY DISCLOSURE AND 
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS 1 (2015). 
 208.  For example, there is an entire field of “Dispute System Design” devoted to studying how 
conflicts, disputes, issues of concern, and legal cases are (or ought to be) identified and raised, 
defined and labeled, and processed and ignored within “the context of a system of rules, processes, 
steps, and forums” in both public and private sectors.  Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: 
Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict, 24 OH. ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2008); 
see also CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS 
(1996); Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 124–25 (2009).  How to design an ideal alternative to the tort system 
is an important question but lies beyond the scope of this Article, which instead focuses on the 
relationship between policy reform objectives and the dispute systems chosen by policymakers to 
deliver them. 
 2017] TRIAL AND ERROR 285 
again, ADR provides the means for testing how these reform objectives can 
be achieved.  
B.  A Dispute Resolution Model Where Negligence Doesn’t Rule 
The patient safety paradigm’s emphasis on healthcare delivery systems 
and non-adversarial problem-solving contrasts sharply with the conventional 
tort system and necessitates an alternative model of corrective justice. 
Consider, first, the patient safety movement’s focus on system failures 
as opposed to individual failures.  The tort negligence model requires demon-
strating that an individual’s failure to perform at a reasonable standard caused 
harm to someone else.  But the IOM report and subsequent patient safety 
literature blames the fragmented and decentralized healthcare delivery sys-
tem itself, rather than individual bad actors, for treatment errors that harm 
patients.209  The healthcare delivery system is characterized as a system of 
interdependent human and nonhuman elements.210  For example, intravenous 
delivery of medication during surgery can involve automated equipment and 
a number of different people—nurses, anesthesiologists, and bioengineering 
staff—to set-up, program, and monitor drug infusion during the procedure.211  
Under the IOM’s “system” analysis, potential errors might occur because of 
“the equipment, the people, their interactions with each other and with the 
equipment, the procedures in place, and the physical design of the surgical 
suite in which the equipment and people function.”212  Thus, negligence pro-
vides a poor fit for addressing errors in this system context because individ-
uals’ single, isolated, unreasonable acts may not be a proximate or actual 
causes of the harm. 
Next, consider the patient safety movement’s call for open and transpar-
ent communication in order to help injured patients and prevent system errors 
from reoccurring.  In the conventional tort system, the adversarialism of liti-
gation threatens communication between doctors and patients and can lead 
to the “bristling” and “cloaking” behaviors discussed earlier.213  Without dis-
cussion of medical injuries, a patient harmed by a medical procedure may not 
know that an accident occurred, let alone who to hold responsible, which 
prevents healthcare providers from implementing safeguards in the future. 
A number of different proposals and experiments have emerged for im-
plementing an alternative, patient safety and systems-oriented reform project, 
but the one with the greatest traction combines new corrective justice norms 
                                                          
 209.  INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 52.  
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. at 50–51. 
 212.  Id. at 52. 
 213.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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with informal ADR processes.214  This Section explores these alternative 
norms and processes and contrasts them with earlier generations of ADR in-
terventions. 
1.  Alternative Corrective Justice Norms 
Two important normative differences exist between traditional tort neg-
ligence and a model of corrective justice that derives from a patient safety 
paradigm.  First, the burden of recognizing and communicating the injury 
shifts from the injured patient to the provider and, second, the standard for 
measuring whether a patient’s injury deserves compensation shifts from legal 
negligence to “preventable adverse events.”215 
A patient safety model of corrective justice re-envisions how parties 
communicate about a healthcare incident.  In the traditional tort system, the 
onus for recognizing and bringing claims is placed on the injured patient—
often the party least informed about whether an injury resulted from sub-
standard care.  In order for an injured patient to receive compensation under 
the tort model, the patient must first recognize the wrong, identify the respon-
sible party, and believe that the harm is deserving of redress.216  Then, she 
                                                          
 214.  For example, some proposals call for state-run, no-fault administrative systems—compa-
rable to the workers’ compensation systems—an approach that other countries use effectively.  
Sage, supra note 203, at 31, 39–40; WEILER, supra note 20, at 115–58.  For discussion of no-fault 
programs in other countries, see Marie Bismark & Ron Paterson, No-Fault Compensation in New 
Zealand: Harmonizing Injury Compensation, Provider Accountability, and Patient Safety, 25 
HEALTH AFF. 278 (2006); Michelle M. Mello et al., Administrative Compensation for Medical In-
juries: Lessons from Three Foreign Systems, 14 COMMONWEALTH FUND PUB. 1 (2011), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-
brief/2011/jul/1517_mello_admin_compensation_med_injuries.pdf.  Such programs in the United 
States are limited, both in number and in scope, and enjoy varying levels of success.  Gil Siegal et 
al., Adjudicating Severe Birth Injury Claims in Florida and Virginia: The Experience of a Landmark 
Experiment in Personal Injury Compensation, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 489 (2008).  Others propose 
creating “Health Courts” for malpractice claims in which specialized judges and trained, neutral 
medical experts assess claims and apply a broader liability standard than tortious negligence for 
determining compensation.  PAUL BARRINGER, COMMON GOOD, WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY: 
STATE-BASED IDEAS FOR IMPROVING MEDICAL INJURY COMPENSATION AND ENHANCING 
PATIENT SAFETY (2006), http://commongood.3cdn.net/40b8923081a2c002be _o6m6vzft7.pdf; 
Michelle M. Mello et al., “Health Courts” and Accountability for Patient Safety, 84 MILBANK Q. 
459, 461 (2006) [hereinafter Mello et al., Health Courts].  And yet another proposal is for states to 
create “early offer” programs that provide a structured process for respondents to assess patient 
claims shortly after filing and offer compensation for economic damages and appropriate attorneys’ 
fees under a statutorily defined scale.  JONI HERSCH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., EVALUATION OF EARLY OFFER REFORM OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: FINAL 
REPORT 1 (2006), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ pdf/74726/medmalcl.pdf. 
 215.  For more guidance on vocabulary for classifying iatrogenic injuries due to error, see supra 
note 22. 
 216.  This “naming, blaming, claiming” process was aptly named and described by William L.F. 
Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Nam-
ing, Blaming and Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 630–49 (1981).  Even after determin-
ing that a wrong deserves redress, a claimant has additional stages to complete in order to prevail in 
litigation: recognizing the wrong; motivation to pursue redress; filing a formal complaint in order 
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must initiate the legal process by filing a formal complaint and demand for 
relief.  Under a patient safety model, however, providers take the initiative to 
disclose errors and, in exchange, receive legal protections to ensure reporting 
is not used in future litigation.217  This call for greater disclosure and trans-
parency contrasts sharply with the “deny and defend” tactic adopted by those 
providers who, when something goes wrong, withhold apologies and provide 
minimal information for fear that any remarks will be used against them in 
litigation.218  Furthermore, by first engaging in direct communication to dis-
cuss the problem of an adverse medical event, the parties can avoid the nar-
row, adversarial “binary clashes” established through formal legal plead-
ing.219  Patients and providers become partners with a shared objective—
understanding what went wrong to cause the adverse outcome—rather than 
adversaries pitted against one another in a legal contest.220 
Advocates of shifting the burden of communication from patient to pro-
vider expect a number of positive impacts, primarily improved deterrence of 
future injury and adequate compensation.221  Advocates hope that changing 
norms of medico-legal culture toward acknowledgement and disclosure of 
medical errors will lead to a better understanding of why system breakdowns 
                                                          
for the gears of the tort liability system to start turning and, once a claim is made, surviving the 
slings and arrows of civil procedure.  Dauer, supra note 163, at 1031.  It is worth noting that this 
problem of claim transformation is not unique to medical malpractice and exists across the civil 
litigation landscape.  
 217.  See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 109–31.  
 218.  Carol B. Liebman & Chris Stern Hyman, Disclosure and Fair Resolution of Adverse 
Events, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 191, 
195–200; Studdert et al., supra note 85, at 287; Troyen A. Brennan & Michelle M. Mello, Patient 
Safety and Medical Malpractice: A Case Study, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 267, 271–72 (2003).  
For a contrary view to the idea that the values of patient safety and medical malpractice litigation 
work at cross purposes, see Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1224 (2013) (concluding that, based on qualitative research findings, malpractice 
liability does not necessarily inhibit openness and transparency, nor does information gained from 
malpractice lawsuits fail to advance patient safety).  
 219.  Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 737 (2005).  In the 
modern adjudicative system, in which cases settle most often through bargained settlement rather 
than trial, “[t]he process of crafting a pleading invites disputants and their counsel to conceive of 
the problem in particular terms” just as “[r]eceiving the other side’s pleadings similarly shapes the 
way that a disputant internally defines the problem to be resolved.” Id. at 736.  Thus: 
The process of drafting and receiving initial pleadings invites disputants to frame disputes 
as binary clashes, to conceive of past events in absolute terms, to base solutions solely 
on entitlements stemming from prior events, and to filter out as irrelevant a vast body of 
information related to the circumstances underlying the dispute. 
Id. at 737. 
 220.  Michael T. Colatrella, Jr., A “Lawyer for All Seasons”: The Lawyer as Conflict Manager, 
49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 145 (2012). 
 221.  See, e.g., Jonathan Todres, Toward Healing and Restoration for All: Reframing Medical 
Malpractice Reform, 39 CONN. L. REV. 667, 718–36 (2006) (arguing that open communication and 
disclosure has potential restorative benefits for providers, patients, and the community). 
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occur and how to prevent them in the future.222  Furthermore, greater numbers 
of injured patients would learn about what happened and be able to request 
compensation for their injuries, if needed.  System-wide costs associated with 
defensive medicine and litigation would decrease, and more open and coop-
erative relationships between providers and patients would develop.223 
A second important distinction between the patient safety paradigm and 
tort is the criterion for determining whether an injured patient is entitled to 
compensation.  In tort, a patient must prove legal negligence, which requires 
both affirmative demonstration of a provider’s failure to comply with the 
standard of care and that such failure proximately caused the injury.  A pa-
tient safety approach utilizes a broader “preventable adverse event” standard.  
While “adverse events” are generally defined as injuries occurring from 
“medical management” rather than the patient’s underlying health condi-
tion,224 the IOM report defines “preventable adverse event” as an adverse 
event attributable to “error,” where “error” is considered “the failure of a 
planned action to be completed as intended (in other words, an error of exe-
cution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (or, an error of plan-
ning).”225  Some errors may fit the definition of legal negligence but not all.  
For example, a provider who, because of incomplete information in the pa-
tient’s chart, does not know that a patient has a penicillin allergy and subse-
quently prescribes the wrong medication, causing injury to the patient,226 con-
stitutes a system error, but it may not be tortious negligence. 
The “preventable adverse events” and negligence standards differ in 
subtle, yet important, ways.227  In contrast to tortious negligence, the “pre-
ventable adverse event” standard is broader and would include even those 
                                                          
 222.  See, e.g., Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851 (1994); David Blumenthal, 
Making Medical Errors Into ‘Medical Treasures’, 272 JAMA 1867 (1994); Brennan et al., supra 
note 66, at 93, 97.   
 223.  See Brennan et al., supra note 66, at 93.  While the disclosure approach is gaining ground, 
results of early studies of whether disclosure programs do—or do not—trigger more litigation and 
their impact on liability costs are mixed.  See Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs 
Before and After Implementation of a Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 213 (2010) (showing early disclosure in one program did reduce costs); Laura Field et al., 
Does Disclosure Deter or Trigger Litigation?, 39 J. ACCOUNT. ECON. 487 (2005) (finding that early 
disclosure does not trigger more litigation); cf. David M. Studdert et al., Disclosure of Medical 
Injury to Patients: An Improbable Risk Management Strategy, 26 HEALTH AFF. 215 (2007) (arguing 
that a simulation to test the hypothesis that disclosure will result in fewer claims suggested that 
decreases in frequency or cost of malpractice litigation were unlikely and increases likely).  Addi-
tional information is needed to determine their effectiveness. 
 224.  Brennan et al., supra note 44, at 370.  
 225.  INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 28 (citing JAMES T. REASON, HUMAN ERROR (1990)). 
 226.  E.g., Donna M. Woods et al., Ambulatory Care Adverse Events and Preventable Adverse 
Events Leading to a Hospital Admission, 16 QUALITY & SAFETY IN HEALTH CARE 127, 129 (2007) 
(missing clinical information is a common system error that leads to preventable diagnostic errors); 
Elder & Dovey, supra note 22 at 928. 
 227.  The variation within the literature about how the “preventable adverse event” standard is 
defined creates additional confusion.  See, e.g., Leape et al., supra note 44, at 377.  For an expanded 
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harms caused when no specific tortfeasor can be identified.  Entitlement to 
compensation under a “preventable adverse event” standard means the pa-
tient’s injury would not have occurred had best practices for healthcare de-
livery been in place during the course of treatment.228  The standard seems 
analogous to common law res ipsa loquitur because establishing proximate 
causation is no longer required.  Instead, negligence is implied under the the-
ory that, had best practices been in place, the injury would not have occurred.  
Thus, this alternative standard replaces the corrective justice model provided 
by tort.  A system-based inquiry (asking, what, if anything, might have gone 
wrong to yield this adverse outcome?) takes the place of the injured patient 
bearing the burden of proving which individual actions were substandard and 
directly responsible for causing her harm. 
2.  Alternative Procedures 
Patient safety reform advocates and scholars have proposed a variety of 
alternative dispute resolution processes to implement this patient-safety-in-
spired, alternative model of corrective justice, the most widely attempted of 
which is the Communication and Resolution Program (“CRP”).229  Here, as 
in previous generations discussed above, an ADR process is crafted and de-
ployed in the medical malpractice setting as the means to achieve specific 
reform objectives.  CRPs largely exist as privately established programs 
within closed healthcare organizations or offered by malpractice insurance 
companies.230  Programs take different forms but they all operate within the 
patient safety movement’s systems-based paradigm.  CRPs are an ADR pro-
cess designed for early disclosure of errors and direct conversation between 
providers and patients.231  A CRP assembles injured patients, their families, 
                                                          
discussion of the difference between negligence and error, both in the legal and medical fields, see 
Kapp, supra note 66, at 754.  
 228.  Mello et al., Health Courts, supra note 214, at 461.  Of course, “best practices” sounds a 
lot like establishing standards for a duty of care, something that healthcare providers, and many 
other professions, for that matter, have long fought against for fear that it invites second-guessing 
of their professional judgment and exposes them to liability even when they may be providing what 
they deem acceptable care.  WEILER, supra note 20, at 30 (describing early tort reform efforts to 
define standards of care by local, as opposed to national, standards and to restrict res ipsa loquitur 
to only certain kinds of injury); SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 38, at 86–92 box 4.1. 
 229.  Compared to other alternative corrective justice models, discussed supra note 214. 
 230.  Michelle M. Mello et al., Communication-and-Resolution Programs: The Challenges and 
Lessons Learned from Six Early Adopters, 33 HEALTH AFF. 20, 22 (2014) (discussing CRPs offered 
by “noncaptive” professional liability insurance companies neither owned nor controlled by 
healthcare facilities or at self-insured hospitals). 
 231.  Liebman & Hyman, supra note 218.  In 2009, President Obama directed the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services to help states and healthcare organizations develop adverse 
event disclosure and dispute resolution programs as well as to explore new models of healthcare 
delivery.  Under this initiative, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality funded seven 
demonstration projects, totaling $19.7 million.  AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, 
PATIENT SAFETY AND MEDICAL LIABILITY INITIATIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS (2014), 
 290 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:247 
and providers for a voluntary discussion of any unanticipated outcome of 
medical treatment.  Conversations usually happen soon after an adverse inci-
dent and proceed informally, without set rules or procedures or a third-party 
adjudicator.  The primary inquiry of whether compensation is warranted de-
pends on whether the injury sustained could have been prevented.  There is 
no requirement, as in tort, that the patient’s injuries be the direct result of an 
individual medical practitioner’s wrongdoing or failure to abide by reasona-
ble standards of care. 
One CRP model, called “early settlement,” relies upon internal investi-
gation into whether an error occurred during medical treatment and is used 
primarily by self-insured hospitals.232  The CRP process begins when an un-
anticipated healthcare outcome is reported by hospital staff or complaints 
from patients and their family members.  Then, designated and trained CRP 
staff with clinical backgrounds investigate the incident to determine whether 
an error in fact occurred and, if so, why.  The CRP staff then meet directly 
with the patient to discuss the results of the investigation, explain what hap-
pened, admit any errors, and apologize for injuries caused.  If the investiga-
tion uncovered no error, then no compensation is provided; however, if an 
error is identified, then the hospital works with the patient to reach a mutual 
agreement about compensation.233  The hospital may require the patient to 
sign a release of future claims.234  Patients and their families are not legally 
obligated to participate and can pursue litigation at any point.235  Whether or 
not the CRP reports the preventable adverse event to the NPDB depends on 
the program.  For example, some CRPs report only on behalf of the paying 
institution, not individual clinicians, while others identify individual clini-
cians only if investigations revealed that person to be primarily responsible 
for the error.236 
A second CRP model, called “limited reimbursement,” does not serve 
as a substitute process for tort litigation and departs more radically from tort’s 
                                                          
http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/patient-safety-resources/resources/liabil-
ity/liability_initiative.html [hereinafter PATIENT SAFETY]. 
 232.  PATIENT SAFETY, supra note 231, at 20–22. 
 233.  The Michigan Model: Medical Malpractice and Patient Safety at UMHS, UNIV. OF MICH., 
http://www.uofmhealth.org/michigan-model-medical-malpractice-and-patient-safety-umhs#sum-
mary (last visited Dec. 27, 2016) [hereinafter The Michigan Model].   
 234.  Id.; see also Michelle M. Mello et al., Implementing Hospital-Based Communication-And-
Resolution Programs: Lessons Learned In New York City, 33 HEALTH AFF. 30, 32 ex. 2 (2014). 
 235.  See, e.g., Boothman et al., supra note 71, at 137–43 (detailing the open-ended nature of 
discussions between hospitals, patients, and their respective lawyers and explaining that, ultimately, 
after exchanging information, “agreements are reached—agreements to drop the claim, agreements 
to settle (sometimes with an apology), and occasionally, agreements to disagree” and proceed to 
court).  For a comparison among different CRPs, see Mello, supra note 230, at 20. 
 236.  Mello, supra note 230, at 22. 
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corrective justice model.237  Under this model, the liability insurance com-
pany works with providers to determine if a patient’s unanticipated outcome 
occurred independently from his underlying disease; there is no investigation 
into fault or error.238  If the adverse event is not related to the patient’s under-
lying condition, program administrators pay patients up to $30,000 for reim-
bursement of out-of-pocket expenses and loss of time or they may waive 
medical bills as an additional form of compensation.239  Because investiga-
tion and reimbursement amounts are limited, these programs are reserved for 
simpler cases and exclude those situations involving death, attorneys, written 
notices of complaint, or records requests.240  Furthermore, because providers 
do not issue reimbursements in response to written claims, patients are not 
required to waive future legal claims, nor is the provider required to report 
the compensation payment to the NPDB.241 
While the reasons for implementing CRP include those of earlier ADR 
interventions—to avoid court litigation and the associated investments of 
time and financial resources—CRPs also seek to improve communication be-
tween patients and providers.  CRPs are still too new to assess their full im-
pact.  Anecdotal evidence from a few healthcare organizations, however, sug-
gests that legal claims and litigation costs have dropped dramatically after 
implementation of a CRP, ultimately leading to a leveling of malpractice li-
ability insurance costs.242  However, there are concerns that the increased dis-
closure built-in to the CRP process will increase tort litigation as more pa-
tients learn of potential tort claims.243  It remains to be seen whether other 
                                                          
 237.  Id. 
 238.  See, e.g., COPIC, “Recognize, Respond, Resolve”: A Successful Approach to Disclosure, 
PHYSICIAN INSURER, 2007 Fourth Quarter, at 16, 18, https://callcopic.com/who-we-are/news-
room/articles/Documents/4q%2007%20Physician%20Insurer_COPIC%20Article.pdf (summariz-
ing the COPIC program); Mello, supra note 230, at 21 (“Program administrators determine whether 
the unanticipated care outcome was caused by the medical care that was delivered or was the result 
of the patient’s underlying disease . . . .”). 
 239.  Mello, supra note 230, at 20–21. 
 240.  Id. at 21 ex. 1.  The CRPs at West Virginia Mutual Insurance Company and Coverys (for-
merly ProMutual Group) also exclude cases where patients are dissatisfied with the aesthetic results 
of cosmetic surgery.  Id.  
 241.  Id. 
 242.  The University of Michigan Health System CRP that reports more than a fifty percent drop 
in claims and lawsuits, more than fifty percent reductions in legal costs per case, fifty percent shorter 
timeline for opening-to-closing claims, significantly lower claim payouts when compared to the 
national average, and unchanged malpractice insurance premiums in spite of increased clinical busi-
ness.  The Michigan Model, supra note 233.  The Stanford University Medical Indemnity and Trust 
Insurance Company’s CRP, called Process for the Early Assessment and Resolution of Loss 
(PEARL), noted a drop in claim volume of eighty-seven percent and much faster rates of closing 
claims.  Jeffrey Driver & Renée Bernard, Enterprise Risk Management, in THE SAGES MANUAL 
OF QUALITY, OUTCOMES AND PATIENT SAFETY 529, 536 (David S. Tichansky et al. eds., 2012).  
 243.  Allen Kachalia et al., Does Full Disclosure of Medical Errors Affect Malpractice Liability? 
The Jury Is Still Out, 29 JOINT COMM’N J. QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 503 (2003); Studdert et 
al., supra note 223, at 215.   
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goals, such as increased patient safety through prevention of medical errors 
and greater numbers of injured individuals being compensated, will be 
achieved.244  These concerns are addressed in greater depth by examining 
Oregon’s CRP.245 
IV.  THE FOURTH GENERATION: EARLY DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION 
Oregon became the first state to enact legislation establishing a 
statewide, publicly administered CRP that uses a structured ADR process.246  
Oregon’s Resolution of Adverse Healthcare Incidents Act took effect in July 
2014.247  It directs the Oregon Patient Safety Commission (“the Commis-
sion”), a semi-independent state agency, to create and administer an Early 
Discussion and Resolution (“EDR”) Program, which has now been in place 
for two years.  The EDR Program provides a sequence of disclosure, discus-
sion, and mediation for patients and their providers to address adverse 
healthcare incidents and appropriate compensation without resorting to tort 
litigation.248  This law is significant because it marks the first time a state has 
institutionalized an ADR-based medical malpractice reform that expressly 
engages alternate corrective justice norms. 
                                                          
 244.  For a discussion of one program’s findings on these other goals, see Richert E. Quinn & 
Mary C. Eichler, The 3Rs Program: The Colorado Experience, 51 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 709, 709–10 (2008) (reporting that the underlying motivation for COPIC’s CRP pro-
gram was a perception that too many liability insurance dollars were paying for litigation and not 
reaching injured parties, that “truly substandard” care was not caught or addressed by the legal 
system, and that the tort system cast a shadow of adversarialism that destroyed patient-physician 
relationships). 
 245.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 246.  Other states have enacted laws that enable CRPs.  William M. Sage et al., How Policy 
Makers Can Smooth the Way for Communication-and-Resolution Programs, 33 HEALTH AFF. 11, 
12 (2014). 
 247.  Adverse Health Incidents Act, ch. 5, § 21, 2013 Or. Laws 1, 7.  For more information on 
the Oregon Patient Safety Commission, see About, OR. PATIENT SAFETY COMM’N, https://oregon-
patientsafety.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).  
 248.  Other states have passed legislation promoting early disclosure and resolution but Oregon 
is the first to establish a structured ADR process for early disclosure.  Massachusetts, for example, 
passed two laws in 2012 that, in conjunction, create opportunity for early resolution.  The first re-
quires mandatory disclosure of adverse events resulting in “significant medical complication” by 
health providers to patients.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79L (2012).  The second is a pre-filing 
written notice and waiting period requirement that creates time and space for parties to discuss set-
tlement.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60L (2015).  Illinois’ legislature created a pilot disclosure 
and apology program—“SorryWorks!”—directed at a single hospital.  710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
45/401–45/999 (West 2016), invalidated by Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 
(2010).  Most recently, in 2015, Iowa passed a law that permits providers to disclose adverse inci-
dents to patients and then engage in confidential discussions about the incident and any compensa-
tion that may be warranted.  IOWA CODE § 135P.3 (2015).  Interestingly, Iowa’s law indicates that 
providers must notify patients of the right to seek legal counsel if they are otherwise unrepresented.  
Despite these legislative initiatives, there are those who question whether disclosure and apology 
can really do better than tort litigation.  See, e.g., Gabriel H. Teninbaum, How Medical Apology 
Programs Harm Patients, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 307 (2011). 
 2017] TRIAL AND ERROR 293 
This Part first explores the public policy goals of the EDR program, its 
structure, and how it differs from lawmakers’ earlier ADR interventions.  
Then, after discussing the initial results from the first two years of the pro-
gram’s operation, it identifies important concerns that need to be addressed 
in order for the EDR program to accomplish its reform objectives.  
A.  EDR Policy Goals and Structure 
Oregon’s lawmakers deliberately designed the EDR Program to respond 
to both the state’s medical malpractice liability problems249 as well as patient 
safety concerns.  Housed under the jurisdiction of the state’s Patient Safety 
Commission, and closely tied to the state’s early disclosure reporting pro-
gram, this ADR procedural intervention is inspired by the patient safety 
movement’s philosophy that openness, transparency, and cooperation reduce 
medical malpractice liability costs, deliver patient compensation, and deter 
future injuries more effectively than tort litigation.250  The problems the law 
intends to fix include both the high costs of the medical liability insurance 
system as well as harms highlighted by the IOM report: patients suffering 
preventable injuries yet receiving no compensation and a lack of communi-
cation between providers and patients that allows errors to recur.251 
To achieve these policy goals, the EDR process creates a new method 
for dispute resolution that sidesteps court and tort.  The law establishes a se-
quence of opportunities for conversation between patients and providers252 
regarding an “adverse healthcare incident,” which is defined as an “objective, 
definable and unanticipated consequence of patient care that is usually pre-
ventable and results in the death of or serious physical injury to the pa-
tient.”253  What constitutes a “serious” physical injury is left open for patients 
                                                          
 249.  Oregon’s medical malpractice insurance rates have decreased in recent years although in 
the early 2000s, Oregon was considered a “crisis” state by the American Medical Association be-
cause its malpractice insurance rates were increasing rapidly.  Some providers could not maintain 
coverage payments, causing concern that providers would leave the practice of medicine, particu-
larly in rural areas.  U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW 
HEALTHCARE CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY 
OF HEALTHCARE 6, 18 (2003).  But more recent reports from Oregon’s Department of Consumer 
and Business Services indicate that premiums have decreased and are continuing to do so.  News 
Release, Dep’t of Consumer & Bus. Servs., Oregon Medical Malpractice Rates Continue to De-
crease (Apr. 15, 2010).  
 250.  See Relating to the Resolution of Matters Related to Health Care: Hearing on S.B. 483 
Before the Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 77th Sess. (Or. 2013) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 
483] (statement of Dr. Bud Pierce, President, Or. Med. Ass’n at 8:57–15:40), http://oregon.grani-
cus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=11&clip_id=2380 (last visited Dec. 27, 2016). 
 251.  Id. (statement of Or. Gov. John Kitzhaber at 4:46–5:15), http://oregon.granicus.com/Me-
diaPlayer.php?view_id=11&clip_id=2380 (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).  
 252.  For a full list of providers, see Adverse Health Incidents Act § 1(3), 2013 Or. Laws at 1.  
 253.  Id. § 1(1), 2013 Or. Laws at 1.  As was noted during the Oregon Senate Judiciary hearing, 
the decision to use the “adverse healthcare incident” as opposed to “negligence” standard was not 
coincidental—the drafters of the legislation wanted to use the same standard that already existed in 
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and providers to determine on a case-by-case basis.  The injury need not be 
the result of negligence.  Indeed, the statute makes no mention of negligence 
except to clarify that participation in EDR will toll the statute of limitations 
for future civil actions and does not prevent a patient from pursuing litiga-
tion.254 
Either patients and their families or healthcare providers can initiate 
EDR, but participation in each step is voluntary, meaning that patients and 
providers both have to opt-in to participate at each stage of the process.255  
Once they choose to participate, however, they must comply with specific 
notice requirements.256  The drafters of the legislation believed that the pro-
gram would work better if providers were incentivized to participate rather 
than forced and also wanted to preserve parties’ ability to access the courts.257 
The first step in the sequence is that someone—a patient, a healthcare 
provider, or a healthcare facility—makes a request to have a conversation 
                                                          
Oregon law to trigger reporting to state licensing boards.  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 442.831 
(2015).  This language was developed organically by the working group tasked by the Governor to 
develop draft legislation and was not modeled on the tort negligence or no-fault standards for de-
termining liability.  Telephone interview with Richard Lane, Co-Chair, Task Force on Resolution 
of Adverse Healthcare Incidents (Aug. 6, 2015). 
 254.  Adverse Health Incidents Act §§ 3(7), 7(1), 7(2), 2013 Or. Laws at 1, 2, 3.  The EDR 
program was conceived to provide an additional avenue for injured patients to obtain compensation, 
especially those patients that might not be able to secure significant settlements through litigation, 
but not to replace civil litigation or encroach on citizens’ rights to a jury trial.  Telephone interview 
with Richard Lane, Co-Chair, Task Force on Resolution of Adverse Healthcare Incidents (Aug. 6, 
2015).  
 255.  See, e.g., Adverse Health Incidents Act § 2(1)(a), 2013 Or. Laws at 1 (“health care facility 
may file a notice . . .”) (emphasis added)); id § 2(3), 2013 Or. Laws at 1 (“A[a] patient may file a 
notice . . . .”); id. § 3(1), 2013 Or. Laws at 2 (“A heath care facility or health care provider who files 
or is named in a notice of adverse health care incident . . . and the patient involved in the incident 
may engage in a discussion . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 5(1), 2013 Or. Laws at 3 (“If a discus-
sion . . . does not result in the resolution of an adverse health care incident, the patient and the health 
care facility or health care provider . . . may enter into mediation.” (emphasis added)).  The permis-
sive nature of the bill proposed and ultimately passed by the legislature is a change from the draft 
legislation proposed by the Governor’s Patient Safety and Defensive Medicine Work Group, which 
made the disclosure, discussion, and mediation mandatory. 
 256.  See, e.g., id. § 2(1)(b)-(c), 2013 Or. Laws at 1 (“If a health care facility files a notice of 
adverse health care incident . . . facility shall provide a copy of the notice to the patient” and “may 
not include the name of a health care provider . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Oregon administrative 
rules further elaborate on the procedural requirements for the stages of the EDR process.  OR. 
ADMIN. R. 325-035-0001 to -0045 (2014).  
 257.  Hearing on S.B. 483, supra note 250 (statement of Sen. Jeff Kruse at 22:13), http://ore-
gon.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=11&clip_id=2380 (last visited Dec. 27, 2016); see 
also id. (written statement of Gwen Dayton, General Counsel, Or. Med. Ass’n), 
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2013R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/4494 (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2016).  Additional incentives to participate include waiving the statutory requirement for 
parties to negligence claims to participate in some form of dispute resolution.  OR. REV. STAT. § 
31.250 (2015).  There are currently no plans to make the program mandatory, in large part because 
the Patient Safety Commission does not want to be in the position of policing and enforcement.  
Telephone interview with Melissa Parkerton, Director, Early Discussion and Resolution Program 
(July 8, 2015). 
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about an adverse healthcare incident.258  The request is made through the Or-
egon Patient Safety Commission, which serves as an impartial third party 
convenor, notifying other parties of the request for conversation and connect-
ing patients and providers to one another.259 
Once all parties have been notified of the adverse healthcare incident, 
they can choose to discuss the incident or decline the request.  In those dis-
cussions, providers may communicate about how future errors will be pre-
vented260 and may also determine whether the incident warrants compensa-
tion.261  The statute explicitly states that these are not discussions of 
malpractice claims in order to avoid triggering state and federal malpractice 
reporting requirements.262  Indeed, except for offers of compensation, which 
must be in writing, all communications among EDR participants must remain 
oral.263  If the provider makes an offer of compensation, it must advise the 
patient of the patient’s right to consult with an attorney before accepting it.264  
If discussions do not result in a resolution, then the parties may proceed to 
the second step, mediation.265  Patients retain the right to proceed with a tra-
ditional claim in court if the EDR process proves unsatisfactory.266  Through-
out the EDR process, discussion communications are confidential, do not 
constitute an admission of liability, and may not be disclosed in any subse-
quent adjudicatory proceeding, which includes judicial, administrative, or ar-
bitration proceedings.267  EDR’s structural design elements derive from the 
patient safety movement’s objectives and therefore offer a radical departure 
                                                          
 258.  Adverse Health Incidents Act § 3, 2013 Or. Laws at 2.  When the patient files the notice, 
the Commission notifies all providers named in the notice; however, if a provider or facility files 
the notice, then the providers bear the responsibility for notifying the patient.  Id. §§ 2, 3.  
 259.  OR. PATIENT SAFETY COMM’N, EARLY DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION ANNUAL REPORT: 
JULY 2014 –JUNE 2016, at 2–3 (2016), http://oregonpatientsafety.org/docs/edr/EDR_ Annual_Re-
port_July2014-June2016.pdf (discussing the Commission’s role). 
 260.  Adverse Health Incidents Act § 3(4), 2013 Or. Laws at 2.  
 261.  Id.  
 262.  See infra IV.C. 
 263.  Adverse Health Incidents Act §§ 3(4), 3(6), 2013 Or. Laws at 2. 
 264.  Id. § 3(5), 2013 Or. Laws at 2. 
 265.  Id.  The Oregon Patient Safety Commission is charged with developing and maintaining a 
roster of qualified mediators.  Telephone interview with Melissa Parkerton, Director, Oregon Early 
Discussion and Resolution Program (July 8, 2015).  In order for mediators to be on the Patient 
Safety Commission’s approved roster, the mediators completed a mandatory training provided by a 
private, non-profit organization, the Oregon Mediation Association.  Id.  The content of the training 
included information about medical malpractice and negligence.  Id.   
 266.  Hearing on S.B. 483, supra note 250 (statement of Dr. Bud Pierce, President, Or. Med. 
Ass’n at 14:15), http://oregon.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=11&clip_id=2380 (last vis-
ited Dec. 27, 2016). 
 267.  Adverse Health Incidents Act § 4(2), 2013 Or. Laws at 2.  “Communications” include not 
only oral and written communications made during discussions, but also any memoranda, work 
product, documents, etc. prepared in connection with the discussions.  Id. § 4(1), 2013 Or. Laws at 
2. 
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from the previous ADR procedural interventions used in the medical liability 
context. 
B.  Comparing EDR to Earlier ADR Interventions 
Oregon’s Early Discussion and Resolution program institutes an alter-
native corrective justice paradigm in ways earlier generations of ADR-based 
medical malpractice reforms could not, and cannot.  EDR shows promise be-
cause, for the first time, it offers an ADR process structured in such a way 
that it can respond to fundamental problems with the medical liability system.  
According to its statutory design, EDR is completely disconnected from 
courts and legal procedures.  Conversations include the parties most inti-
mately involved in or impacted by the adverse medical incident, and parties’ 
communications are not restricted by, or limited to, narrow legal issues.  Each 
of these unique characteristics will be discussed in turn. 
Previously, state regulation of medical malpractice was tied to legal 
claiming.  Legislatures used a plaintiff’s act of filing a claim as the regulatory 
access point for imposing screening panels, mediation, or binding arbitration.  
For any of these specialized procedures to occur, the patient first had to dis-
cover the injury, think it must have been caused by negligence, and then de-
cide to pursue a complaint. 
But, in EDR, the patient’s legal claim is not the triggering event that 
begins to move the gears of dispute resolution.  Instead, anyone can request 
a conversation after an adverse outcome of medical treatment.  EDR democ-
ratizes access to the resolution process by shifting responsibility from the 
patient and her family to everyone informed about the incident—the individ-
ual healthcare provider, the provider’s employer, or a health facility.  Thus, 
by decoupling the ADR process from the initiation of a formal complaint, the 
connection between the EDR process and formal litigation diminishes.  The 
content of the discussion can broaden to include the incident itself, the con-
cerns of all affected parties, and the methods to compensate injuries fairly 
and prevent future errors.268  And because these conversations happen soon 
after an incident occurs, often before any legal claim, they may be less litiga-
tion-centric than conversations in earlier generations of ADR.269 
A second important difference between EDR and some previous ADR 
procedural reforms concerns the participants and the nature of their discus-
sions.  Screening panels, binding arbitration, and pre-trial mediation operate 
within the adversarial framework of litigation, where relevant information is 
defined as that which pertains to proving legal arguments.  Lawyers do much 
of the talking, and parties, in some cases, may be more concerned about 
                                                          
 268.  See Moffitt, supra note 219, at 751. 
 269.  See, e.g., Farber & White, A Comparison, supra note 59, at 777, 780–82 (concluding that 
patients involved in cases initiated through the hospital’s incident reports were less litigious than 
patients who initiated cases through a complaint or lawsuit).  
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avoiding saying the wrong thing.  Of all the previous generations of ADR, 
mediation perhaps permits the greatest opportunity for open communication 
and transparency because of its confidentiality protections, which enable par-
ties to make gestures of sympathy during mediation without fear that it will 
come back to haunt them in court.  But, once litigation begins, very few pro-
viders actually participate in mediation.  Lawyers for the provider come from 
the liability insurer, so the potential for direct communication between the 
provider and the injured patient and the patient’s family is limited.270  In con-
trast, the EDR discussions are open to any and all individuals involved in the 
incident, and providers must reasonably accommodate anyone who wishes to 
participate.  While EDR does not go as far as other CRPs, which may require 
providers to participate unless they have a good reason not to,271 it still ena-
bles the effected individuals to open direct lines of communication and fos-
ters transparency more than any previous ADR intervention. 
Third, unlike binding arbitration and medical screening panels, but sim-
ilar to mediation, in EDR there is no third party acting as a finder of fact and 
assessing the merits of the patient’s legal claims.  Discussions between pa-
tients and providers take the form of direct negotiations or, in some cases, 
mediated discussions.272  Because there is no third party decisionmaker, the 
patient and the providers together determine the outcome of discussions and 
whether to formalize these discussions into a legally enforceable contract.273  
Similarly, unlike binding arbitration, the patient is not contractually obligated 
to accept EDR offers and those offers cannot become part of a subsequent 
court record, as do the findings of some medical screening panels.  Of course, 
EDRs can raise a different and related issue: providers or healthcare admin-
istrators simultaneously function as the respondent and the entity determining 
whether compensation is warranted and for what amount.274 
Fourth, in EDR, because the incident has not yet been transformed into 
a legal claim, theoretically, tortious negligence need not be the only yardstick 
for determining whether the patient is entitled to compensation.  Instead, par-
ties can rely on the vague “preventable adverse health care incident” standard 
discussed earlier.275  Screening panels and binding arbitration still involve 
assessing whether the plaintiff can show that the treatment was substandard 
and whether the treatment, even if substandard, was the legal cause of the 
                                                          
 270.  Liebman, supra note 184, at 144–45.  
 271.  See, e.g., Mello et al., supra note 230, at 22 (showing that the University of Illinois Medical 
Center at Chicago requires mandatory provider participation and the University of Michigan Health 
System presumes provider participation unless provider refuses). 
 272.  Liebman & Hyman, supra note 218, at 205.   
 273.  Id. at 205–06. 
 274.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 275.  Adverse Health Incidents Act, ch. 5, § 1(1), 2013 Or. Laws 1, 1.  “‘Adverse health care 
incident’ means an objective, definable and unanticipated consequence of patient care that is usually 
preventable and results in the death of or serious physical injury to the patient.”  Id. 
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injury.  In pre-trial mediation, the parties often negotiate based on how likely 
they are to prevail in court, bargaining in the shadow of the law.276  This is 
not to say, however, that discussions and negotiations in EDRs are somehow 
untethered from the outcomes of other, litigated cases277 or uninfluenced by 
tort norms,278 but they are less confined by them. 
C.  Progress? Evaluating the Newest Generation of Dispute Resolution 
Procedure 
Oregon’s EDR program, as a stand-alone alternative, represents the far-
thest move away from the traditional tort system and litigation over liability 
for medical injuries.  After only two years in operation, it remains too early 
to draw definitive conclusions about whether Oregon’s program will accom-
plish its broader policy objectives of reducing costs associated with medical 
malpractice liability litigation, increasing access to compensation, and im-
proving safety of the healthcare delivery system.279 
However, initial data gathered from EDR participant surveys identify 
areas for improvement and yield important lessons for other state legislatures 
interested in experimenting with a public, statewide communication and res-
olution program.  This Section discusses some early results from Oregon’s 
program and then explores three additional concerns that will also need to be 
addressed. 
1.  Early Results 
The Oregon Patient Safety Commission gathers data about EDR by ask-
ing individuals who initiated, or were the subjects of, a Request for Conver-
sation to complete a “Resolution Report,” no matter whether an EDR con-
versation occurred or not.280  There have been sixty-seven Requests for EDR 
since it began in 2014.  Unfortunately, the Commission only received back 
Reports related to thirty-six EDR Requests and, of those Reports received, a 
                                                          
 276.  See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 985–88 (1979). 
 277.  Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil Settle-
ments, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 974–77, 979–83 (2010) (discussing the substantive feedback ef-
fect of settlements, a phenomenon in which settlement outcomes influence what parties and judges 
view as appropriate outcomes for subsequent, similarly situated cases). 
 278.  Eisenberg, supra note 137 (noting that negotiation, like adjudication, is heavily influenced 
by legal norms, with parties frequently invoking principles, rules, and precedents to create leverage 
in bargaining). 
 279.  OR. PATIENT SAFETY COMM’N, supra note 259, at 4 (explaining that no mechanism cur-
rently exists for capturing total numbers of adverse medical incidents or medical malpractice claims 
in Oregon, which means there is no baseline for comparing the patient safety and medical liability 
pictures before and after EDR).   
 280.  Id. at 3.  Individuals can complete Reports even of EDR was declined or no conversation 
occurred.  Id. at 7.  
 2017] TRIAL AND ERROR 299 
third were incomplete.281  Nevertheless, information from the Reports sheds 
some light on who elects to participate in EDR and why, what kinds of ad-
verse incidents prompt EDR Requests, which topics parties discuss in EDR, 
as well as parties’ perceptions of the process. 
When it comes to soliciting and participating in EDR, patients are far 
more likely to initiate a Request for Conversation than are healthcare profes-
sionals.282  Male and female patients are equally likely to engage EDR; how-
ever, older patients (in their fifties and sixties) are much more likely to re-
quest EDR than their younger counterparts.283  Adult children or the spouses 
of patients sought EDR more often than parents or guardians of patients.284  
In forty-two percent of all patient Requests for EDR for the first two years, 
at least one healthcare professional agreed to participate.285  There is no data 
explaining why healthcare providers and facilities affirmatively accepted 
EDR Requests although there is information about why they might decline.  
Healthcare providers most often declined patient EDR Requests because they 
intended to use an alternative process or were advised against participation 
by their liability insurer or legal counsel.286  Healthcare facilities primarily 
declined patient Requests for EDR because they elected to use their own, 
internal mechanisms to resolving patient complaints or because the incident 
involved someone not employed by the facility.287  Interestingly, no 
healthcare professionals cited fear of reporting to the Oregon Medical Board 
or the NPDB as a reason for refusing to participate.288 
EDR Requests arose from different kinds of adverse medical incidents 
and EDR conversations included a range of topics.  Both patients and 
healthcare providers asked for EDR following invasive surgical procedures 
or when there was a delay in care.289  When EDR conversations took place, 
providers described discussing many more topics than did patients.  Providers 
said they talked with the patients about an adverse event and why it occurred; 
                                                          
 281.  Id. at 4. 
 282.  Id. at 4.  Out of sixty-seven Requests for EDR, fifty-seven came from patients and ten came 
from healthcare professionals. Id. at 5.  
 283.  Id. at 11.  Patient-initiated EDR Requests may be directed at multiple healthcare providers 
or facilities and each of these provider entities can choose to accept or decline the Request.  Id. at 
5. 
 284.  Id. at 12. 
 285.  Id. at 5.  
 286.  Id. at 5–6.  A few providers indicated they had declined to participate because they learned 
that the facility would not be participating and elected not to participate either; that they did not 
believe the incident met the definition of an adverse healthcare event; or that they had already ad-
dressed the incident through another process.  Id. at 6. 
 287.  Id. at 5–6.  A few healthcare facilities declined because they believed the event was specific 
to the particular physician involved.  Id. at 6. 
 288.  Id. at 5. 
 289.  Id. at 7.  Patients also asked for EDR for events involving medication, healthcare-related 
infections, and medical devices, among others.  Id.  
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information about an error that occurred; patient’s health, future treatment, 
and follow-up; as well as how additional information would be shared mov-
ing forward.290  Patients, however, described discussing a much narrower set 
of issues, such as an adverse event and why it happened, that a medical error 
did not occur, and whether or not there might be compensation.291  One no-
table finding from parties’ Reports is that their accounts of EDR conversa-
tions rarely overlap and sometimes even contradict each other.292 
Perhaps the most intriguing data gleaned from the Resolution Reports 
reveals stark differences in patients’ and healthcare professionals’ percep-
tions of the EDR process.  First, most healthcare providers indicated they 
were satisfied or very satisfied with the EDR process while patients’ re-
sponses ranged more widely from very satisfied to not at all satisfied, with 
more than half indicating they were not at all satisfied.293  Second, in a couple 
of cases, the providers said a satisfactory resolution was reached whereas the 
patients said that nothing was resolved and that the healthcare professionals 
had shown a “lack of accountability or respect.”294  And, third, no correlation 
could be found between whether or not an apology was extended during EDR 
and either the parties’ satisfaction with the process or their belief that the 
underlying issue had been resolved.295  In fact, healthcare professionals re-
ported making offers of apology far more often than patients reported receiv-
ing them, suggesting that the parties may have different views on what passes 
for an apology.296 
The Commission draws some important lessons from the data collected 
thus far.  For example, it observes that healthcare organizations that respond 
promptly to patients’ EDR requests are far more likely to reach satisfactory 
resolutions in EDR because the longer patients are left without information 
the more likely they are to lose trust in the resolution process, become suspi-
cious that the provider is hiding something, and feel anxious or disre-
spected.297  The recommendation for healthcare providers and facilities is to 
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engage patients promptly after an adverse incident, ideally within seventy-
two hours, with a preliminary conversation.298  Another important lesson is 
that adverse incidents involving multiple stakeholders—the healthcare facil-
ity where the incident occurred, the facility’s liability insurer, all the 
healthcare professionals plus their employers and liability insurers—can be-
come enormously complex and difficult to coordinate for EDR, particularly 
if they have different views of who bears responsibility for the incident.299  
The Commission recommends establishing clear lines of communication 
among potential stakeholders in advance so that, in the event they receive a 
patient request for EDR, they can respond promptly and in coordination.300  
And, finally, another clear lesson from the first two years of EDR is that pa-
tients and their families need more help navigating the process.301  Help could 
come in the form of a social worker or even a legal advocate, discussed fur-
ther below,302 as well as the insertion of a mediator to facilitate EDR conver-
sations.  The apparent ubiquity of misunderstanding about what is said during 
EDR and the mismatch in parties’ perceptions of the process is a clarion call 
for a mediator.  As the Commission observes, healthcare professionals may 
rely on difficult-to-understand technical language or “continue on script” 
when patients are experiencing strong emotions and perhaps “temporarily 
unable to listen.”303  Mediators, particularly those trained in facilitation, can 
help clarify what parties are saying, what is being heard, and how they view 
one another.304 
All of these recommendations from the Commission surely will improve 
the functioning of the EDR program.  Nevertheless, because EDR departs 
from long established legal norms and procedures, it raises additional con-
cerns to those flagged by the Commission that need further attention. 
2.  Critical Issues Requiring Attention 
Oregon’s EDR program has the potential to solve problems with the 
medical liability system precisely because it is so far removed from the tort 
system’s traditional notions of adversarialism and negligence.  However, this 
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very same distancing raises a number of concerns that will need to be ad-
dressed in order for EDR to effectuate the kind of substantive reforms envi-
sioned by the patient safety movement.305 
a.  Incentivize Providers to Participate 
The first concern is whether providers will be incentivized to participate 
in a voluntary process like EDR.  The low number of provider Requests for 
EDR (only ten in the first two years) signals that providers do not think they 
need EDR.306  This seems counterintuitive since, in EDR, providers have con-
siderable procedural power.  They control whether to disclose a preventable 
adverse event in the first place, whether to respond promptly to a patient 
complaint, and whether to offer apologies or compensation.  In order for EDR 
to work, providers will have to buy-in to the process and believe that it pre-
sents a better alternative than the status quo of tort litigation. 
What would be sufficiently motivating for a provider to choose EDR?  
One potential enticement could be that EDR provides a constructive process 
to disclose and address harmful errors where before there was none.  While 
some providers may feel morally or ethically compelled to disclose errors, 
many do not.307  Some providers remain suspicious about whether such dis-
closure practices will make them vulnerable to more liability308 or do not feel 
empowered to come forward and identify incidents in which a patient re-
ceived poor care.309  For those providers who are afraid of litigation, embar-
rassed about the error, or simply unsure about how to disclose information so 
that it can have a positive effect,310 EDR offers a safe outlet.  Providers have 
an opportunity for disclosure in a contained, confidential environment and in 
the context of a structured process with an articulated purpose. 
Nevertheless, even if providers do see the benefit of the EDR process, 
they still may not participate because it remains unclear how EDR will impact 
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future litigation rates and providers’ liability insurance.  Some studies of dis-
closure programs suggest that alerting more patients to medical errors may 
actually increase the volume of tort litigation as more patients learn of poten-
tial tort claims.311  Collectively, this might lead to greater liability insurance 
costs for providers—the very issue that has captivated legislators since the 
early days of medical malpractice reform.  Then again, the disclosure pro-
grams examined by these studies operated in isolation, without an accompa-
nying alternative dispute resolution process like EDR.  It may be that the only 
way to secure provider participation at this early stage in EDR is by adjusting 
the law to require providers to participate in patient-initiated Requests for 
Conversation and perhaps offering additional protections from future liability 
in all but the most egregious cases.  
With time, once EDR is used more widely, these additional incentives 
and requirements could be phased out.  Patients and providers may discover 
that engaging with one another about a medical injury in an alternative venue 
proves more satisfying, less expensive, and more predictable than litigating.  
Providers may also discover that, as the Commission warns, failure to re-
spond to patients’ EDR requests in a timely manner may exacerbate patients’ 
feelings of anger and distrust, ultimately leading to more conflict than reso-
lution; in which case, it is very much in the providers’ interest to engage EDR 
early and often.  It still remains to be seen how disclosure, when coupled with 
an open and informal ADR process, will affect patients’ decisions about 
whether to pursue a legal claim.  If policymakers want to institutionalize the 
kind of culture change envisioned by the patient safety movement, they will 
need greater buy-in from providers, which first requires a better understand-
ing of the direct financial impact EDR will have on providers.312 
b.  Help Patients Access Legal Assistance 
EDR’s distancing from the traditional tort system raises another im-
portant issue that legislators will need to address: how patients will access 
legal counsel.  The Commission acknowledges that patients, particularly 
those without legal or medical expertise, will need help understanding the 
risks and benefits associated with the EDR process.  For example, should a 
patient agree to accept an offer of compensation and release a provider from 
future liability?  If a provider offers to reimburse the patient for certain 
healthcare costs, will the patient keep that money, or must some or all of it 
be shared with her health insurance company?  And, what are the tax impli-
cations for a patient who accepts monetary compensation from a provider 
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since, technically, they are not proceeds from settlement of a lawsuit?313  
While Oregon’s EDR statute places responsibility on providers to inform pa-
tients of their right to consult an attorney before agreeing to any offer of com-
pensation,314 it is not yet clear if, and how, these patients will access the legal 
help they will need to make informed decisions.315  Yet, even as it recognizes 
patients need for support and advocacy, the Commission sounds tentative 
about encouraging patients to bring legal representation to EDR as “facilities 
and providers can be less willing to participate if the patient is repre-
sented.”316  It may seem like a difficult policy choice: whether to trade pro-
viders’ willingness to participate for patients’ access to sound advice. But for 
EDR and any other programs like it to be fair, the choice is clear—patients 
should not be left to fend for themselves. 
And, indeed, patients in such programs will likely be left to fend for 
themselves because accessing legal counsel for EDR operates very differ-
ently than under the conventional tort system.  The tort system depends upon 
contingency fee arrangements to help patients with valid claims find legal 
assistance.  Under these arrangements, an injured patient pays for an attor-
ney’s services only if the attorney succeeds in securing a settlement award.317  
Furthermore, most jurisdictions cap attorneys’ contingency fees at thirty per-
cent of the award.318  As a consequence, lawyers are incentivized to take only 
those cases that have both a good chance of winning and a sizeable enough 
potential payout to cover the attorney’s out-of-pocket expenses.319  EDR, de-
signed to avoid the costs of litigation, also avoids the financial rewards of 
litigation, and therefore may not prove attractive to lawyers.  Sidestepping 
litigation not only changes the attorneys’ role but also their cost-benefit anal-
yses of whether to take a case.320  Furthermore, a thirty percent contingency 
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fee seems too steep for the limited counseling or negotiating a lawyer might 
do in EDR.  Helping patients in EDR, therefore, will require a different busi-
ness model for lawyers. 
There are creative ways to build access to legal counsel into the EDR 
model.  For example, an in-house CRP program in Massachusetts has part-
nered with the Massachusetts Bar Association to increase patient access to 
legal representation in its early settlement process.  Attorneys are provided 
with a “best practices” guide explaining how the program differs from litiga-
tion and how patients should be represented when they participate.321  Attor-
neys are told that a compensatory fee structure may not be appropriate since 
they will not be engaging in the “extensive and expensive discovery and ex-
pert review associated with traditional litigation and trial.”322  It is recom-
mended instead that they consider an hourly rate or reduced contingency fee.  
For a public, statewide program like Oregon’s EDR, partnerships with local 
or state bar associations, best practices information or trainings for attorneys, 
as well as an available roster of attorneys who are competent in this alterna-
tive process, could all ensure that appropriate legal assistance is available and 
accessible for patients in this alternative corrective justice system. 
c.  Clarify Federal Reporting Requirements 
Finally, another issue requiring attention is whether EDR’s ability to 
skirt NPDB reporting requirements is in fact good public policy.  Under fed-
eral law, healthcare entities and insurance companies must report to the 
NPDB any payments made to settle a claim or satisfy a judgment on behalf 
of a provider against whom a claim for medical malpractice was brought.323  
Further, state licensing boards and peer accreditation organizations must re-
port adverse actions taken against providers.324  The federal reporting pro-
gram collects information on malpractice claims against individual providers 
in order to create a way for hospitals, employers, and licensing entities to 
track and assess the provider’s professional competence and conduct.325  
While the ultimate purpose of the NPDB is to improve the quality of medical 
care, some in the medical profession view it as an unwarranted “blacklisting” 
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that can destroy a physician’s career.326  At least one study shows that pro-
viders become more reluctant to settle liability claims if settlement triggers 
the NPDB mandatory reporting requirement.327 
Oregon’s EDR program provides a way around the NPDB reporting re-
quirement.  The law explicitly states that a payment made as a result of EDR 
discussion or mediation does not constitute a “payment resulting from a writ-
ten claim or demand for payment.”328  It further exempts notices of adverse 
healthcare incidents from state statutory reporting requirements to profes-
sional licensing boards.329  Despite concern from constituents,330 the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services, which oversees the NPDB, agreed 
that oral EDR discussions could be excluded from reporting requirements, 
but not written offers.331 
How EDR will affect existing “tensions and ambiguities” of the NPDB 
remains unclear.332  On the one hand, keeping settlement discussions oral in 
order to avoid the NPDB may create the extra incentive that providers need 
to engage in disclosure and settlement.  On the other hand, a patient, partic-
ularly one without a lawyer, might not fully understand the legal and financial 
implications of a settlement offer that is not reduced to writing. 
Just as previous ADR experiments have been tried and tested for their 
ability to deliver reform objectives, robust empirical study of Oregon’s EDR 
program should continue.  In order to know whether this alternative approach 
advances corrective justice, we need to assess the impact of EDR on provid-
ers’ incentives to disclose errors and participate in conversation, on patients’ 
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ability to access legal counsel and make informed decisions about settlement 
offers, as well as on existing federal reporting requirements. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
For almost fifty years, state legislatures have experimented, and con-
tinue to experiment, with ADR interventions in the hope that adding new 
procedural elements to medical liability claims will change parties’ interac-
tions and ultimately yield improved policy outcomes.  Some of these experi-
ments have not succeeded while others show promise. 
Statutes imposing ADR processes like screening panels, binding arbi-
tration, and mandatory mediation, which rely upon a tort-based approach to 
corrective justice, proved ineffective in addressing persistent, structural prob-
lems within the U.S. medical malpractice system.  These ADR processes 
were used to restrain access to courts and to increase the likelihood that, if 
filed, lawsuits would ultimately settle.  They did not address the high inci-
dence of patient death and injury, lack of transparency and communication, 
uncompensated and undercompensated patients, and the perpetuation of 
medical errors. 
The rise of the patient safety movement, with its values of transparency, 
cooperation, and inclusivity, opened the door to an alternative vision of cor-
rective justice in the medical malpractice context.  It has also created a new 
role for ADR not only as an alternative process but also a promising alterna-
tive venue for patients and providers to engage one another directly about 
preventable injuries caused by medical treatment. 
Considering all of these ADR interventions collectively, a pattern 
emerges: with each successive dispute resolution procedure, both the sub-
stantive elements of tort and the formal rules of litigation diminish in im-
portance.  The process becomes increasingly informal and consensus-based 
as parties, rather than a third-party neutral, retain control over the ADR out-
comes.  Also, the reference point for the ADR process moves away from tort-
based determinations of fault and towards an alternative, systems-based par-
adigm of compensation. 
Of all the ADR interventions used in the medical malpractice context, 
the first generation, medical screening panels, revolves most tightly around 
tort litigation.  The medical screening panel considers the evidence in light 
of the elements of tort negligence, operating as a procedural checkpoint to 
assess the merit of a plaintiff’s claim and determine whether it is worthy to 
continue on to court.  Thus, the substantive tort analysis and the question of 
future litigation remain very much at the center of the process. 
Orbiting further away from court litigation are second and third genera-
tion interventions like binding arbitration and mediated settlement.  Binding 
arbitration is removed altogether from the tort system because it replaces 
court litigation as a method of dispute resolution.  Parties are therefore less 
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concerned than they would be in other ADR processes about continuing on 
to litigate the same issues in court.  However, binding arbitration remains tied 
to the court process both in its format, since it operates as private adjudica-
tion, as well as its legal analysis to determine tortious negligence.333  Con-
versely, mediation uses a non-adjudicative structure but does not replace the 
courts.  Indeed, both pre- and post-filing mediation mandates anticipate liti-
gation and encourage pre-adjudication settlement of medical malpractice 
claims.  Mediation, however, in contrast to arbitration and medical screening 
panels, allows for more than an analysis of the parties’ legal rights and enti-
tlements under tort by creating a confidential space for those intangible com-
ponents of dispute resolution—apologies and acknowledgments of pain and 
hardship.334 
And finally, the newest generation of an ADR tort reform, exemplified 
by Oregon’s EDR program, is situated even farther away from tort litigation 
though it, too, is not completely free from the tort system’s gravitational pull.  
Both EDR’s procedural and substantive dimensions provide alternative 
frameworks for corrective justice.  The informal discussion and mediation 
between parties are designed to replace the need for a court process, though, 
unlike privately contracted binding arbitration, does not displace it entirely.  
Determining whether compensation is warranted relies upon a systems-based 
inquiry that imposes an expectation of disclosure on providers and applies a 
“preventable adverse event” standard instead of negligence. 
The EDR process opens up a truly alternative world: one that uses a 
different yardstick to measure whether compensation is owed, resolves dis-
putes without formal legal claiming, and limits the state’s regulatory reach.  
This alternative ADR design has the potential to address profound shortcom-
ings in the medical liability system in ways previous ADR interventions 
could not.  However, as ADR based procedural reforms move farther away 
from traditional, tort based principles and towards alternate conceptions of 
justice, they also raise new concerns.  The challenge for policymakers, attor-
neys, providers, and patients will be to understand how to resolve these prob-
lems so that ADR can function as a vehicle for delivering, rather than erod-
ing, corrective justice. 
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